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THE ENLISTMENT CONTRACT: A UNIFORM 
APPROACH* 
Captain David A. Schlueter** 
I. INTRODUCTION 
I, , do solemnly swear (or affirm) that  I will 
support and defend the Constitution of the  United States  
against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that  I will bear 
t rue  faith and allegiance to  the same; and that  I will obey 
the  orders of the President of the United States  and the 
orders  of the  officers appointed over me, according to 
regulations and the Uniform Code of Military Justice. So 
help me God.’ 
The enlistee completes the  oath and a voice proudly announces: 
“You‘re in the Army now!” Despite the  confidence with which this 
announcement is made, the United States  Court of Military Appeals 
has, in a series of decisions,2 cast doubt on the validity of hundreds 
of e n l i ~ t r n e n t s . ~  Those opinions highlight the continuing legal prob- 
lems surrounding enlistments. There is a wealth of law in the area, 
but little uniformity. There are many judicial and administrative 
opinions covering the topic, but little statutory guidance. 
* This article is an adaptation of a thesis presented to The Judge Advocate Gener- 
al’s School, U.S. Army, Charlottesville, Virginia while t he  author was a member 
of the Twenty-fifth Judge  Advocate Officer Advanced Class. The opinions and 
conclusions expressed in this article a r e  those of t he  author and do not necessarily 
represent t he  views of The Judge Advocate General‘s School or any other  gov- 
ernmental  agency. 
** JAGC,  U.S. Army. Ins t ructor ,  Criminal Law Division, The Judge Advocate 
General‘s School. B.A., 1969, Texas A&M University; J . D . ,  1971, Baylor La\\ 
School. Member of t he  Bars of Texas,  t he  District of Columbia, the  United Sta tes  
Army Court  of Military Review, the  United Sta tes  Court  of Military Appeals, and 
the  United Sta tes  Supreme Court .  
10 U.S.C. § 502 (1970) (enlistment oath). 
S e e ,  e.g., United Sta tes  v. Russo, 23 C.M.A. 511, 50 C.M.R. 650 (1975); United 
Sta tes  v.  Brown, 23 C.M.A. 1G2, 48 C.M.R. 778 (1974); United Sta tes  v.  Catlow, 
23 C.M.A. 142, 48 C.M.R. 758 (1974). 
The term “enlistment” is awkward. It has been used to  describe the  act of “en- 
rolling” in the  armed forces. See United S ta t e s  v. King, 11 C.M.A. 19, 28 C.M.R. 
243 (1959). Periodically i t  is used to describe the  completed act or the  actual 
period of military service. Tyler v. Pomeroy, 90 Mass. (8 Allen) 480, 485 (1864). 
Research fails to  find a decision which clearly differentiates between the  two us- 
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The topic of enlistments arises with such regulavity because the 
conceptual attributes of enlistment determine the substance of the 
soldier-state relationship. The nature, validity, and consequences of 
the enlistment contract touch almost every facet of military law, 
including such areas as court-martial jurisdiction, right to pay, dis- 
charges, ancl retirement benefits. Particularly troublesome is the  
fact that  the rules which determine the validity of an enlistment 
contract in one area might be inapplicable in another area. This 
situation results from the fact that  the  federal district and circuit 
courts typically analyze the administrative and civil incidents of en- 
listment contracts while courts-martial and the Courts of Military 
Review and Appeals restrict their inquiry to  relationship between 
the  enlistment and military criminal jurisdiction over the  enlistee. 
Perhaps because of this difference in focus, the inconsistencies be- 
tween the federal district and circuit courts' perspective and the 
military courts' perspective of the enlistment a re  marked. 
As the peace-time Army tests  the feasibility of an all-volunteer 
force, the Court of Military Appeals has declared the enlistment to 
effect a change of "status" ancl to create a unique legal relationship. 
The mainstream of the  American judicial system, however, has 
shown an increasing tendency to label all legal relationships as  "con- 
tractual." For  bet ter  or worse, the soldier-state relationship has not 
been immune from this tendency to characterize relationships as 
binding contracts, agreements, compacts, and covenants. 
What has prompted the difference in perspective? There are no 
standard answers but three factors seem to  lie a t  the root of the 
problem: 
a. Lack of a concise and uniform definition of the term 
ages. For  purposes of this article, the  term "enlistment" will be used to  describe 
the  act of becoming a soldier (servicemember, enlistee) in the  armed forces. 
The "enlistee" is a person who has entered the  armed forces voluntarily, see  1u 
U.S.C.  § 104(4) (1970), o r  a reserve unit, s e e  id .  % 261 (19i0).  He is to be distin- 
guished from (1) inductees, who a re  inducted into the  armed forces under the  
Selective Service laws. Eman v .  Clifford, 287 F .  Supp. 334, 338 (S .D.  Cal. 1968); 
or (2) officers, who a re  appointed to  office by the President.  C'f. Babbit v .  United 
Sta tes ,  16 Ct.  C1. 202 (18801, ~ . f ? d .  104 U.S. X i  (18821, where the  court distin- 
guished West Point cadets from officers, noncommissioned officers a n d  enlistees. 
The court also noted tha t  "enlistment" is a technical word with a technical mean- 
ing, derived from British law. 16 Ct .  C1. a t  213. 
The term "enlistment" is often used in conjunction with the  terms "enrollment" 
and "muster."  Enrollment might be defined as joining the  ranks and muster  refers 
to the  calling together of an armed force. Although both terms were used fre- 
quently in early opinions, they a re  no longer a part  of the vocabulary used t o  
assess the validity and effect of "enlistments." 
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“enlistment.” Does it create a contractual relationship 
or  a s tatus or both? Or neither? 
b. Diverse opinions as  to  what rules or  bodies of law 
apply to  the soldier-state relationship. 
e. The role of public policy in determining the  validity of 
the  enlistment agreement ancl the resulting status. 
This article examines the  diverse views, the resulting problems, 
and the feasibility of a uniform approach to enlistments. The inquiry 
begins with an historical analysis of the soldier-state relationship. 
11. HISTORICAL ROOTS O F  THE 
SOLDIER-STATE RELATIONSHIP 
The concept of the soldier-state relationship has deep roots. It 
draws from centuries of tradition, and although the surface charac- 
teristics have changed through the years, the  core of the relation 
has remained unchanged: The sovereign’s power to  raise armed 
forces is paramount and all citizens may be called upon to serve in 
those forces. 
Feudal armies were raised by lords who pledged their allegiance 
to the  monarch for a specified period in return for lands, honors, 
and reciprocal protection. Subjects of the lord owed allegiance only 
to  him and performed military services for him. When their speci- 
fied period of service was completed they returned to  their farms 
ancl families. 
The feudal army model remained until the  advent of what we 
might call international wars. For  example, in the Hundred Years 
War, Charles V of France hired a professional army of infantry, 
cavalry, and artillery. These bands of fighting men worked under a 
captain o r  colonel like workmen under a contractor. They served in 
return for wages, and when the money ran out, the soldiers left 
their posts.4 
Direct sovereign control of national armies began with the reign 
of Louis XIV.  He  raised mass professional armies which were paid 
by him and owed allegiance directly to him. He  supplied them with 
the king’s uniform and demanded loyalty from both officers and pri- 
vate soldiers. The soldiers were recruited by enticing them with a 
bounty, and their service consisted largely of standing ready to 
fight for the king.5 
The early British armies varied little from the French model. One 
F. STERN, THE CITIZEN ARMY 5: (1957). 
I d .  a t  56. 
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writer suggests that  the roots of the American military tradition 
trace back to the Assize of Arms promulgated by King Henry II .6  
The soldier's pay ancl allegiance were linked directly to  the reigning 
monarch. During periods of national stability, recruiting practices 
and terms of service remained unchanged. However, during periods 
of unrest,  the  monarch was a t  liberty to impress vagrants into serv- 
ice and increase the punishments for m i s c ~ n d u c t . ~  
It was this system of direct allegiance that  eventually found i ts  
way into the  new world. Instead of relying heavily on the profes- 
sional army,  the early American colonies looked almost exclusively 
to the militia, farmers and townspeople ready to take up arms.  
However, the militia proved to be of limited value when their own 
homes were not being threatened ancl the fighting was taking place 
hundreds of miles away.* The British iwponded to the inadequacies 
of the militia by shipping professional soldiers to  the  colonies and 
intensifying their recruiting techniques. Their techniques for ob- 
taining adequate numbers of American recruits often included the 
use of fraud, trickery, and alcoholic  spirit^.^ 
During the  American Revolution, the colonial plan of depending 
on the regular enlistees was barely adequate in light of the recruit- 
ing problems and the oft-cited shortages of supplies. George Wash- 
ington's frustrations in maintaining an effective fighting force led 
him to propose t he  unpopular concept of compulsory service. lo 
Thus, by the time of the Revolution, American armed forces were 
~~ ~ 
R .  WEIGLEY, HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY 3 (1967). See  Tyler v ,  
Pomeroy, 90 Mass. ( 8  Allen) 480 (1864), which contains a good review of the  
British t rea tment  of enlistments.  
7 Common soldiers  w e r e  in fac t  t h e  d r e g s  of E u r o p e a n  socie ty .  v a g a b o n d s ,  ne 'e r -do-wel ls ,  and 
cr iminals .  t h e  only s o r t s  of men who u e r e  willing t o  risk t h e i r  l ives for  t h e  l i t t le  pay bes towed 
upon t h e m .  . . . Recrui t ing  a r m i e s  f rom t h e  most  sh i f t less  and cr iminal  of men necess i ta ted  in 
t u r n  a n  e x t r e m e l y  stiff discipline u h i c h  in a vicious circle. made a r m y  life ?till  more  u n a t t r a c -  
t i v e  and r e q u i r e d  s t i l l  more  imprePrment  of undes i rables .  
On t h e  o t h e r  hand.  once a so ld ier  w a s  disciplined a n d  t r a i n e d  in w a r f a r e ,  he  r e p r e s e n t e d  a 
cons iderable  financial i n v e s t m e n t ,  and t h e r e f o r e  h is  g o v e r n m e n t  d i d  not d e s i r e  t o  s e e  h im 
killed. Accordingly .  c o m m a n d e r s  p lanned campaigns  and b a t t l e s  in such a wa)  t h a t  t h e  loss of 
life would be  m i n i m i z e d  
R .  WEIGLEY, s u p r a  note 6,  a t  18-19. 
problems during the  French and Indian War ,  wrote: 
Colonel George Washington. af ter  experiencing serious recruiting and discipline 
Militia.  you will f ind .  S i r .  will  n e v e r  a n s w e r  y o u r  e x p e c t a t i o n s ,  no  dependence  is t o  h e  placed 
upon t h e m :  T h e )  a r e  obat inae  and p e r v e r s e .  t h e y  a r e  of ten  egged on h)- t h e  Officers.  who lead 
t h e m  t o  a c t s  of d isobedience ,  and when t h e y  a r e  o r d e r e d  t o  c e r t a i n  p o s t s  f o r  t h e  s e c u r i t y  of 
a t u r e s .  or  t h e  protec t ion  of t h e  I n h a b i t a n t s .  u A l .  on a s u d d e n .  resolve  t o  leave  theo i .  and t h r  
Uni ted  vigilance of t h e i r  officers c a n  not p r e v e n t  t h e m .  
I d .  a t  16. 
I d .  a t  18. 
In Voluntary  e n l i i t m e n t a  s e e m  t o  be  e n t i r e l y  o u t  of t h e  ques t ion  [ h e  w r o t e  a s  e a r l y  a s  l i i g ] ,  all 
t h e  a l lurementh  of t h e  most  e x o r b i t a n t  bount ies  and e v e r y  o t h e r  inducement  t h a t  could be  
4 
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composed of a volunteer regular army augmented by conscripts ancl 
a strong militia. 
With some minor adjustments, this formula of a standing army 
serving with a strong militia has prevailed. Likewise, the American 
army has been composed of those who have volunteered their  serv- 
ices and those who, through legislative process, have been inducted 
into service. Even with the suspension of conscription there  con- 
tinues to be a class of soldier that  enters  the  Army to avoid what 
may be perceived as  a less desirable alternative. Despite the  man- 
ner through which the soldier enters the armed forces, the  soldier- 
s ta te  relationship is no longer indirect in nature (soldier-lord-king); 
but ra ther  direct (soldier-state). Soldiers owe allegiance directly to  
the  state.  
As t h e  re la t ionship be tween  t h e  soldier  and t h e  s t a t e  h a s  
changed, so has the judicial and administrative treatment of that  
relationship. As the  relationship has gained sophistication, new 
legal questions concerning pay, recruiting practices, and terms of 
service have arisen. Defining the  relationship and assessing the  
legal basis of the  relationship have not been easy tasks. Courts and 
administrative systems have struggled with the  issue and have in 
some cases reached directly opposite results. 
A. EARLY JUDICIAL VIEWS 
OF THE ENLISTMENT 
The early enlistment cases generally dealt with two recurring 
problem areas: the nature of the enlistment contract and the  effect 
of statutory ancl regulatory controls on its execution. United States 
v. Cottixghau( provides an interesting start ing point in reviewing 
the early judicial view of the subject. 
Cottingham had immigrated from Ireland and, after reenlisting in 
the Army, claimed to be an alien, not having taken any steps to 
become a naturalized citizen. The s ta tute  which set  forth the qual- 
ifications for enlistment spoke in t e r m s  of enlistment of “citi- 
t h o u g h t  of.  have  been t r i e d  in va in ,  a n d  s e e m  t o  h a v e  had l i t t le  o t h e r  ef fec t  t h a n  t o  i n c r e a s e  t h e  
rapaci ty  and ra ise  t h e  d e m a n d s  of t h o s e  t o  whom t h e y  w e r e  held out .  W e  m a y  fairly infer ,  t h a t  
t h e  c o u n t r y  h a s  been a l r e a d y  p r e t t y  well dra ined of t h a t  c lass  of Men whose  t e m p e r s ,  a t t a c h -  
m e n t s  a n d  c i rcumstances  d isposed t h e m  t o  e n t e r  p e r m a n e n t l y .  or for a l e n g t h  of t i m e ,  in to  t h e  
a r m y .  . . . 
I d .  a t  41. The debate over use of compulsory service continues even af ter  the  
arrival  of t he  “all-volunteer” Army. S e e ,  e . g . ,  H. MARMION, THE CASE AGAINST A 
VOLUNTEER ARMY (1971); WHY THE DRAFT? (J. Miller ed. 1968). N o  doubt there  
is a fear tha t  only the  “dregs of society” will agree t o  serve.  See  note 7 s u p m .  
l 1  40 Va. (1 Rob.)  615 (1843). 
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zens." l2 The Supreme Court of Virginia rejected the soldier's ar- 
guments that  the  s tatute  prohibited enlistments of aliens antl that  
any such enlistment would be unlawful and void; and that  as a con- 
t ract ,  the  enlistment was void because it lacked the inclispensible 
ingredient of mutuality. The court observed that  the Government 
could either enforce the  soldier's agreement (or contract) to serve or 
summarily release him from his obligation, with or  without cause. 
The soldier held no such advantage. Despite this lack of mutuality, 
the enlistment coulcl not be voided, because contracts of enlistment 
could not be treated as  typical contracts. 
The qualifications of age, height, and citizenship were, according 
to the  court, intended for the protection of the Government.13 If the  
recruit were a minor, he was protected from youthful mistakes of 
judgment by the requirement that  he obtain consent from an adult. 
The court assumed that  an adult recruit would be aware of his dis- 
ability, and, if he enlisted, he would be guilty of either fraud or 
collusion with the  recrui ter .  Although ei ther  or  both could be 
punikhed, it was the government's prerogative to either void or val- 
idate the  e n 1 i ~ t m e n t . l ~  
But what of the statutory language which required the recruit to 
be a citizen of the  United States? The court stated that the  Gov- 
ernment coulcl waive the disqualification: 
There is no bet ter  rule of interpretation than this,  tha t  " no s ta tu te  
shall be construed in such manner as to be inconvenient or against 
reason." If a recruit were to  claim exoneration from the  service, on 
the  ground tha t  a t  the  time of his enlistment he was under size, o r  
under age, or infirm in body, would it not be a sufficient answer tha t  
t he  government,  in i t s  discretion, waived the  objection, because he  
had since attained the  requisite height or age,  or had recovered,  or 
would probably recover,  from his disease; or because he possessed 
qualities which would more than compensate for his alleged deficien- 
cies? And so if the  plea be tha t  of alienage, is it not enough to say 
tha t ,  though constrained to  t he  admission tha t  t he  native or natu- 
ralized citizen must be supposed to possess grea ter  d o u r ,  higher in- 
telligence and more approved fidelity than a mere s t ranger .  yet t h e w  
may be exceptions to  the  general rule; and tha t  i n  t he  particular case 
l 2  Act of Mar. 16, 1802, ch. 9,  2 Stat .  132, "An Act fixing the  military peace estab- 
lishment of the United Sta tes ."  
l3 40 Va. (1 Rob.) at  667. The provisions of the  1802 Act had a fourfold purpose: (1) 
To keep up the  peacetime establishment of the Army by volunteer enlistments; ( 2 )  
t o  encourage recruiting by paying a premium to the recruiting officer antl a bounty 
to  t he  recruit ;  (3) to  procure for the  Government recruits  best adapted to the  
service, and protect  it against inadequate selections; and (4)  to protect minors 
from their  own improvident engagements.  
l 4  40 Va. (1 Rob.)  at 667. 
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t he  petitioner is  a gallant and disciplined soldier, whose oath of fidel- 
i ty when he took the  bounty, and his long residence and connections 
and interes‘t in t he  country,  furnish sufficient security for the  faithful 
discharge of his duties? l5 
This construction of the  statute was “in the t rue  spirit of the law; 
while the  opposite would open the  door widely to the vilest frauds 
upon the public service.”16 Cottinghanz did not stand alone; how- 
ever, it provides a good summarization of the concepts employed by 
early American courts in dealing with enlistment problems. l 7  
Equally troublesome to the courts was the  problem of determin- 
ing the  validity of minority enlistments. The presence of minors in 
the  armed services was commonplace, and to complicate matters,  
the age requirements fluctuated with the alternating states of war 
and peace. Three years after deciding that  an alien could be en- 
listed, despite congressional language to the contrary, the  Supreme 
Court of Virginia in Uiii ted States v. Blake?zey18 once again dealt 
with the  enlistment. This time it  turned its attention to the enlist- 
ment of a minor. 
Blakeney, who was between the  ages of nineteen and twenty 
years, had enlisted with a company of Virginia volunteers and was 
subsequently mustered into service with the United States when 
the  war with Mexico began. The Act of March 1802,19 which had 
fixed the peacetime establishment of the United States Army, re- 
quired enlistees between the  ages of eighteen and twenty years t o  
obtain the consent of their  parents. No consent had been given in 
this case. At the time of the enlistment, however, Congress, by the  
Act of 1846,*O had authorized the President to call up to 50,000 vol- 
unteers without stating any qualifications concerning the age of the 
troops. Blakeney was among those answering the call. The t reat -  
ment of the problem by the majority and dissenting opinions reveals 
a g r e a t  deal about t h e  prevail ing philosophies concerning the  
soldier-state relationship (specifically, the enlistment) in the first 
half of the nineteenth century. 
l5 I d .  a t  669-70. 
l6 I d .  a t  672. 
“ S e e  United Sta tes  v. Wyngall, 5 Hill ( N . Y . )  16 (18431, where the  court was 
concerned with the effect of an alien’s enlistment in the  Army. The court consid- 
ered  the  enlistment valid, holding the  controlling s t a tu t e  to be only ”directory,“ 
and finding no public policy against enlisting aliens. Historically, the  practice had 
been common. 
l8  44 Va. (3 Grat t . )  387 (1845). 
Act of Mar. 16, 1802, ch. 9,  2 Sta t .  132. 
Act of May 13, 1846, ch. 16, 9 Sta t .  9, “An Act providing for the  prosecution of 
t he  existing war  between the  U.S. and the  Republic of Mexico.” 
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The majority opinion reluctantly recognized the soldier-state rela- 
tionship as  contractual 21 and stressed that the requirement of con- 
sent found in the Act of 1802 must be interpreted in light of a nation 
at  war: 
Every  presumption was in favor of t he  ability to carry arms of vol- 
unteers  thus brought forth and embodied; and nothing more was con- 
templated. If such ability in reference to this s ta tu te  was still to be a 
subject  for judicial decision, instead of official discretion, then it must 
be determined, not by the  special circumstances of each particular 
case, but  by a general rule of uniform application. We know, as  a mat- 
t e r  of fact, tha t  a t  t he  age of eighteen, a man is capable intellectually 
and physically of bearing arms; and tha t  it is the military age recog- 
nized by the  whole legislation of Congress, and of the Sta te  of Vir- 
ginia, and of all the  Sta tes  of the  Union, perhaps without esception. 
There was no temptation and scarcely any room for abuses in the  
execution of the  law; and cases of fraud, and want of consent from 
mental aberration o r  debility, a r e  exceptions from every rule,  and ap- 
plicable to  every age .22 
The court further adopted the  philosophy that  the contract of a 
minor to  serve the State was binding "whenever such an agreement 
is not positively forbidden by the  State." 23  
The dissenting opinion maintained that  the public law should not 
be construed so broadly as  to grant the right to  contract to anyone 
capable of bearing arms: 
The relation between parent and child, is ,  of all others,  the  most 
important.  . . . The whole superstructure of civil society res ts  upon 
i t .  But until there  is an express declaration of an intention to change 
the  rule in reference t o  military contracts,  they must be  controlled 
and regulated by the  principles applicable to o ther  contracts.  We 
must look to  t he  common law a s  existing amongst ourselves, modified 
and adapted to  our peculiar institutions, t o  ascertain whether the  
party entering into a contract of this kind, possesses the  legal capac- 
ity to  bind himself by such an engagement.z4 
2 1  The court hesitated to label the  enlistment as a contract "unless we suffer it to 
mislead us  as to the  t rue  character of t he  thing." 44 Va. (8 Gra t t . )  a t  391. 
22 I d .  a t  399. 
23 I d .  a t  405. The majority opinion, citing Judge Story's  opinion in United Sta tes  
v .  Bainbridge,  24 F. Cas .  946 (C.C.D.  Mass. 18161 ( N o .  14,497), s ta ted  tha t  
"Under t he  Acts of Congress for the  employment of men and boys in the  navy, the  
contracts of enlistment of the  la t te r  a r e  obligatory upon them,  though made a i t h -  
out the  consent of parent ,  master  or guardian." Judge Story s ta ted ,  .'[T]he disabil- 
ities of an infant a r e  intended by law for his own benefit, and not for t he  protec- 
tion of t he  rights of third persons. . . ." 24 F. Cas. a t  950. That minority position 
was later modified when it was recognized tha t  the  s ta tu tes  could be for the  pro- 
tection of the  parent or guardian. S e e .  e.g. .  United Sta tes  IT. Reaves,  126 F. 127 
(6th Cir.  1903). Note tha t  the  minimum age of enlistment in the  Navy was at  one 
time as  low as thirteen years of age. S e e  E x  par.te Brown, 4 F. Cas. 325, 326 n.2 
(C.C.D.C. 1839) (No.  1,972). 
24 44 Va. ( 3  Grat t . )  a t  409 (Allen, J .  dissenting). 
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The dissent’s rationale for considering the minority enlistment in- 
valid was this: In  the  absence of congressional action, the courts 
should look to the s ta te  or municipal law of the location of the  for- 
mation of the enlistment contract. Because the  Act of 1846 calling 
for the volunteers was silent as  to the capacity to contract, and be- 
cause the  Commonwealth of Virginia had not acted specifically on 
the capacity of minors to enlist, the  Act of 1802 controlled. There- 
fore, parental consent should have been obtained.25 
The majority and dissenting opinions in Blakeney reflect the  con- 
flicting views of the  two schools of thought concerning the  nature of 
the enlistment agreement. The one school proposed that  the enlist- 
ment was a contract but that in times of national need, the capacity 
to enter  the  contract should be liberally expanded whether specif- 
ically so stated by Congress or not. Stated another way: “A man old 
enough to die for his country is old enough to serve it.” 26 The oppo- 
site view was that unless Congress had specifically acted in this 
area,  the municipal law of contracts applied. The capacity to con- 
tract  should not be loosely interpreted. 
A review of the early judicial posture toward the enlistment re- 
veals the beginning of two common threads. Firs t ,  the  power of the  
sovereign to raise and support armies is paramount. The nature of 
the relationship and the procedures for entering into i t  may change, 
but  t h e  power t o  e i the r  ask for o r  demand t h e  service of t h e  
citizenry is ever  present.  Second, the  courts have traditionally 
treated the enlistment as  a contract, the terms of which a re  to be 
examined in the light of the sovereign’s ability to raise an army and 
determine the criteria for service in that  army. Public law must be 
considered in interpreting the criteria. These common threads have 
taken some interesting and sometimes bewildering turns.  In doing 
so, they have provided the base for the  numerous and diverse cases 
to follow. 
111. THE SUPREME COURT AND ENLISTMENTS 
In the last half of the  1800’s the federal judiciary began dealing 
~~ 
25 I d .  a t  420. 
26 I d .  a t  406. In  a concurring opinion, Justice Brooke rejected the  application of 
t he  common law of contracts to  t he  case, and noted tha t  t he  minor owed higher 
obligations to  his country. Continuing tha t  theme and reminiscing tha t  t he  mili- 
t a ry  age in the  “Revolution” was sixteen,  Brooke added: “[C]ommissions were  
given to many who were  not twenty-one years  of age.  I myself received a commis- 
sion as  first lieutenant in Col. Harrison’s regiment of art i l lery before I was seven- 
teen years of age,  whilst I was a t  school; and served th ree  years,  to  t he  end of the  
war.’’ I d .  a t  421-22. 
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more and more with enlistments and related issues such as  defining 
the nature of the  enlistment and effect, if any, of the enlistment 
oath. The opposing views of the  majority and dissenting judges in 
Uizited States v. Blakei iey  noted in the preceding section were typi- 
cally reflected in later federal opinions. In  1890, the United States 
Supreme Court addressed the  issue. 
A .  UNITED STATES V .  GRIMLEY 27 
On February 18, 1888, John Grimley, age forty years,  appeared at  
a recrui t ing rendezvous in Boston, r epresen ted  himself t o  be  
twenty-eight years old, and indicated an interest  in joining the  
Army. He took a physical examination, signed the  requisite oath 
and received an issue of clothing. He  went honie, stayed there ,  and 
was later convicted of desertion. While confined, Grimley sought a 
writ of habeas corpus in a Massachusetts district court, alleging 
that  his enlistment was void, and that the  court-martial had been 
without jurisdiction to t ry  him. The basis for this contention was 
that the  enlistment s ta tute  required recruits to  be “between the  
ages of sixteen and thirty-five years,  a t  the  time of their  enlist- 
ment.” 28 Both the district and circuit courts agreed with Grimley 
and held that  he was not amenable to court-martial jurisdiction be- 
cause his enlistment was void. 
Before the Supreme Court, both parties relied on the  numerous 
enlistment cases rendered by both s ta te  and federal courts.29 The 
t h r u s t  of t h e  government’s argument  was t h a t  the  enlistment 
agreement was completed at  the  taking of the oath, and because the  
statutory restrictions were for the benefit of the  Government, the 
contract was voidable only by the Government. The lawyers for 
Grimley relied on a line of cases which had ruled that  enlistments of 
minors were void because the statutory language was clearly pro- 
h i b i t i ~ e . ~ ~  In addition, they argued that  the proceedings a t  the  
~ ~~~ ~ ~ 
27 13‘7 U.S. 147 (1890). 
Section 116 of t he  Revised Sta tu tes  provided: “Recruits  enlisting in the army 
must be effective and able-bodied men, and between the  ages of sixteen and 
thirty-five years ,  a t  the t ime of the i r  enlistment . ”  
The wealth of cases cited by both sides is se t  forth in the  reporter’s preface to  
t he  opinion. At least  one wri ter  feels tha t  the  Court  completely ignored the  briefs 
of the  parties and rendered an ”absurd” opinion. Carpenter ,  Enlistment-A Con- 
t rac t ,  S ta tus ,  or Marriage? (March 1973) (unpublished thesis in The Judge Advo- 
cate General‘s School, U.S. Army). 
30 Grimley’s lawyers cited Uni ted  States E .  Cotti7igharri in support  of their  argu- 
ment tha t  the congressional intent was clear. The recital of “citizen of the  United 
States“ had been subsequently dropped, but  the  age limitation had been retained. 
Thus ,  they argued,  t he  mandatory character  of the  age  requirement was em- 
phasized. 137 U.S.  at  14‘7. 
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rendezvous did not constitute a valid enlistment. 
The Court rejected Grimley’s arguments and held that  an enlist- 
ment had taken place and that the enlistment was voidable only a t  
the  instance of the Government for whose benefit the  s ta tute  had 
been drafted. Because there  was no inherent vice in a forty-year old 
recruit serving his country, the Court felt that  public policy would 
not justify setting the  enlistment aside. Dealing with the  jurisdic- 
tional question, the  Court  in Grimley  utilized language which 
characterized the  enlistment as  a mat ter  of contractual relation.31 
However, the  Court continued: 
But in this transaction something more is involved than the  making 
of a contract ,  whose breach exposes to  an action for damages. Enlist-  
ment is a contract;  but it is one of those contracts which changes the  
s ta tus ;  and where t ha t  is changed, no breach of t he  contract destroys 
the new s ta tus  or relieves from the  obligations which i ts  existence 
imposes. Marriage is a contract;  but it is one which creates a s ta tus .  
I t s  contract obligations a r e  mutual faithfulness; but  a breach of those 
obligations does not destroy the  s ta tus  or change the  relation of the  
parties to each other.  The parties remain husband and wife, no ma t t e r  
what the i r  conduct to  each other-no mat ter  how great  the i r  disre- 
gard of marital obligations. It is t rue  t ha t  courts have power, under 
the  s ta tu tes  of most Sta tes ,  to  terminate those contract obligations 
and put an end to  the  marital relations. But this is never done a t  t he  
instance of the  wrong-doer. The injured par ty ,  and the  injured par ty  
alone, can obtain relief and a change of s ta tus  by judicial action. So 
also, a foreigner by naturalization enters  into new obligations. More 
than tha t ,  he thereby changes his s ta tus ;  he ceases to  be an alien, and 
becomes a citizen, and when tha t  change is once accomplished, no dis- 
loyalty on his pa r t ,  no breach of the  obligations of citizenship, of itself 
destroys his citizenship. In other words,  i t  is a general rule accom- 
panying a change of s ta tus ,  tha t  when once accomplished i t  is not de- 
stroyed by the  mere misconduct of one of t he  parties,  and the  guilty 
par ty  cannot plead his own wrong as working a termination and de- 
struction thereof.32 
Although this language is found in many subsequent cases dealing 
with enlistments, an  often overlooked portion of the opinion dealt 
with the  issue of the  public good. There were repeated references to 
31 137 U.S. a t  150. The Supreme Court  had referred t o  t he  enlistment a s  a con- 
t rac t  on a t  least one prior occasion. In assessing a soldier’s r ight to pay in United 
Sta tes  v. Landers,  92 U.S. 77 (18761, the  Court  noted tha t  the  contract of enlist- 
ment called for faithful service. “The contract is an entirety;  and if service for any 
portion of the  time is criminally omitted,  t he  pay and allowances for faithful serv-  
ice a r e  not earned.” 92 U.S. a t  79. Compare  i d .  wiith Bell v. United Sta tes ,  366 
U.S.  393 (1961) (right to  accrued pay based upon s t a tu t e  not contract r ights)  a n d  
Word v. United Sta tes ,  138 F.2d 499 (8th Cir. 1947). 
3 2  137 U.S. a t  131. 
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Grimley's misrepresentation and the government's reliance on that  
falsehood. 
Implicit in the decision is the common thread revealed earlier in 
Uiiited States u. Cottiiigham and United States v. B l a k e n e y .  Be- 
cause the Government possesses the ultimate power to require the 
service of all persons, the s tatutes  regulating the qualifications of 
the  recruits a re  for the convenience of the Government: 
Now,  there  is no inherent vice in the  military service of a man forty 
years of age.  The age of thirty-five, as  prescribed in the  Sta tu te ,  is 
one of convenience merely. The government has the  right to  t he  mili- 
ta ry  service of all i ts  able-bodied citizens, and may, when emergency 
arises,  justly exact tha t  service from all. And if for i ts  own conveni- 
ence, and with a view to  the  selection of the  best material, i t  has fixed 
the  age a t  thirty-five,  it is a mat ter  which in any given case it may 
waive; and i t  does not lie in the mouth of anyone above tha t  age,  on 
tha t  account alone, to demand release from an obligation voluntarily 
assumed, and discharge from a service voluntarily entered into. The 
government,  and the  government alone, is t he  par ty  to  the  transac- 
tion tha t  can raise objections on tha t  ground. We conclude, therefore,  
tha t  the  age of t he  petitioner was no ground for his discharge 3 3  
B. MORRISSEY v. PERRY 34 
The same day G i i w l e y  was decided, Justice Brewer, again writ- 
ing for the  Supreme Court,  dealt with the problem of minority en- 
listments. In  Morrissey, a seventeen-year-old enlisted in the Army 
without his mother's consent. At  the time of his enlistment the 
s tatutory minimum age was sixteen, and because he was under 
twenty-one years of age parental consent was required. When he 
enlisted he swore that  he was twenty-one years and five months old. 
H e  received his clothing issue and served for approximately three 
weeks before deserting. After an absence of five and one-half years 
he reappeared and demanded his discharge on the ground that  he 
had enlisted as  a minor. 
The Court ruled that  Morrissey was not only a d e  f a c t o  soldier 
but a d e  ,ju?*e soldier as well. Congress, the Court went on to say, 
can set the age a t  which an "infant" can be competent to perform 
either military or civil acts; the requirement of consent was for the 
benefit of the  parents alone.35 Citing its opinion in Griur ley ,  the 
Court stated that an enlistment was not only a contract but also a 
33 I d .  a t  153. 
34 137 U.S. 157 (1890). 
35 I d .  a t  159. At common law an enlistment was not voidable by either t he  minor 
or his parents.  S e e  United Sta tes  v. Blakeney, 44 Va. ( 3  Grat t . )  a t  405, 
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change of status.  Therefore, i t  was not voidable by a minor as  if i t  
were an ordinary contract.36 
What is the significance of these two cases? In arguing their re- 
spective positions, both sides presented to the Supreme Court a 
comprehensive list of existing authorities on the  subject of enlist- 
ments. I t  follows that  Grimley and Morrissey serve as both the 
capstone of the  law of enlistments before 1890 and a s  the  cor- 
nerstone for the body of law which followed. 
IV. FEDERAL DISTRICT AND CIRCUIT COURTS’ 
CONSIDERATION O F  ENLISTMENTS 
Following the  rationale in the  Supreme Court’s opinions, the  
lower federal courts 37 have generally applied contract law princi- 
ples when deciding enlistment questions. Where the validity of the 
enlistment contract is in question, the  cases before the  federal 
courts fall into three categories: 38 
a. Those cases where the  servicemember has enlisted in 
violation of one or more statutory provisions. 
b. Those cases where the servicemember’s enlistment is 
violative of a service regulation. 
c. Those cases where, during the  course of the  enlist- 
ment, an alleged breach (by either party) has occurred. 
The soldier may be raising the invalidity of his enlistment contract 
to avoid the  jurisdiction of a c ~ u r t - m a r t i a l , ~ ~  or he may simply be 
36 The effect of Morr issey  was reviewed in United Sta tes  v. Reaves,  126 F. 127 
(5th Cir. 1903). The court provided a synopsis of t he  minority enlistment problems 
and rejected the  argument  t ha t  because public policy favors parental  control, t he  
enlistment entered without t he  required parental  consent should be considered 
null and void. That position, the  court  s ta ted ,  had been adopted in Zx re Chapman, 
37 F. 327 (N.D.  Ga. 18891, but  had been overruled by the  Supreme Court  in Mor- 
rissey and Gritnley.  The lower court opinion in Reaves,  a t  121 F. 848 (M.D.  Ala. 
1903), presents a thorough discussion of the  “void a b  i?ritio” argument for minor- 
i ty  enlistments entered into without parental  consent. 
37 In this article the  t e rm “federal courts” refers to  those courts established under 
Article I11 of the  United Sta tes  Constitution. 
38 Each category could in t u rn  be broken down into those cases which deal with 
t he  “criminal” aspects of t he  enlistment (validity of the  enlistment contract for 
purposes of court-martial jurisdiction) and those which concentrate on the  civil 
aspects (formation and performance questions). F o r  t he  most par t ,  the  contem- 
porary federal courts a r e  dealing only with t he  civil aspects. This is due in large 
par t  to  requirement t ha t  an individual subjected to trial by court-martial f irst  
e x h a u s t  q u e s t i o n s  of j u r i s d i c t i o n  wi th in  t h e  m i l i t a r y  s y s t e m .  S e e ,  e . g . ,  
Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S. 738 (1975); Hodges v. Callaway, 499 F.2d 417 
(5th Cir. 1974); Mindes v. Seaman, 453 F.2d 197 (5th Cir. 1971). 
39 The servicemember may challenge his military “status” even though no court- 
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attempting to  avoid further service under the agreement. The ulti- 
mate question, though, centers on the nature and validity of the 
relationship between the United States  government and the  sol- 
dier. 40 
A. EFFECT OF STATUTORY COLVTROLS 
With some exceptions, the statutory qualifications for entering 
the armed forces have changed little. In  establishing criteria for 
service, the  Congress has determined who may enter  into a contrac- 
tual relationship with the G ~ v e r n m e n t . ~ ~  What if an enlistment con- 
tract is formed in contravention of a s tatute  which restricts the 
capacity of one of the parties to enter  into the contract? The out- 
come depends upon what is being restricted and for whose benefit 
the restriction has been drafted. 
The statutory restriction most frequently considered deals with 
minority  enlistment^.^^ Almost all federal authorities now agree 
that  if a minor enlists under the minimum statutory age the contract 
is void.43 Although the military courts have decided the the  
federal judiciary has not specifically determined whether such a 
contract ever becomes a voidable or a valid enlistment after the  
minor reaches the minimum age. Likewise, the federal courts have 
not decided whether a minor under the minimum statutory age who 
commits a crime is nonetheless amenable to court-martial jurisdic- 
tion. Early federal decisions indicate that  even statutory defects 
(such as  enlistment without the  required parental consent) 45 which 
martial is pending. See Billings v .  Truesdale,  321 U.S. 542 (1944). Often relief is 
sought through a petition for habeas corpus because military s ta tus  has been 
equated to  "custody" for tha t  purpose. See Jones v .  Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236 
(1962); Hammond v. Lenfest ,  398 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1968). For  a recent discussion 
of habeas corpus review, see McFeeley, H a b e a s  C o r p ~ s  a t i d  Due  Process  F v o i ~  
Warreit to Burgei., 28 BAYLOR L. REV. 533 (1976). 
40 In a number of cases the  alleged irregulari t ies involve both s ta tu tory  and regu- 
latory provisions. For  instance, in E.? p a r t e  Beaver,  271 F. 493 ( N . D .  Ohio 1921), 
the  servicemember was an alien minor (age sixteen) and in E x  p a r t e  Dostal, 243 
F .  664 ( N . D .  Ohio 19171, the  servicemember alleged a fradulent enlistment be- 
cause he was an alien minor who had failed to indicate tha t  he had a dependent 
mother. Both enlistments were  found to be valid. 
41 See Morrissey v. Pe r ry ,  137 U.S. 157 (1890); United Sta tes  v .  Blakeney, 44 Va.  
(3 Gratt .)  387, 396 (1847) (Allen, J .  dissenting). See a l s o  I t !  7.e Davison, 21  F .  618 
(S .D.N.Y.  1884). 
42 10 U.S.C. 5 505(a) (Supp. V 1975). 
43 Morrissey v. Pe r ry ,  137 U.S. 157 (1890); United Sta tes  e x  r e i .  Laikund v .  Wil- 
liford, 220 F. 291 (2d Cir. 1915); cf .  E x  p a r t e  Beaver,  271 F. 493 (N .D .  Ohio 1921). 
44 United S ta t e s  v. Brown, 22 C.M.A. 162, 48 C.M.R.  778 (1974). 
45 Dillingham v. Booker, 163 F. 696 (4th Cir. 1908); United Sta tes  v. Reaves,  126 
F. 127 (5th Cir. 1903); 1u re Miller, 114 F. 838 (5th Cir. 1902). 
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render an enlistment illegal a re  moot af ter  the  soldier has com- 
mitted a crime. Whether contemporary federal courts will maintain 
that  position is questionable. 
The Grimley rationale was reiterated in a series of cases arising 
when soldiers claimed that  their  enlistments, entered into while 
they %ere pending induction, were void, The controlling statute,46 
the  courts declared, was intended for the benefit of the Government 
(the Selective Service boards) and not for the potential i n d ~ c t e e . ~ ’  
S ta tu to ry  restrictions 48 concerning alienage,49 mental  compe- 
tency and criminal records should also be considered for the bene- 
fit of the Government absent some showing that there is some inhe- 
rent  evil in the  contractual relationship. 
Therefore, statutory violations in forming the enlistment contract 
d o  not always render the  contract void-at least in the  eyes of the  
federal In  most cases they a re  voidable a t  the instance of 
46 50 U.S.C. app. S: 465(d) (1970), which s ta tes :  “[Nlo person shall be accepted for 
enlistment af ter  he  has received orders  to repor t  for induction.” 
*‘ Tuxworth v. Froehlke, 449 F.2d 763 (1st Cir. 1971); Stokum v. Warner,  360 F. 
Supp. 261 (C.D. Cal. 1973). But see Moore v. Dalssio, 332 F. Supp. 926 (D. Mass. 
1971). See also  Whitmore v. Ta r r ,  331 F. Supp. 1369 (D. Neb. 1971). 
48 N o  pe r son  who is i n s a n e ,  in tox ica ted ,  o r  a d e s e r t e r  f rom an  a r m e d  fo rce ,  or  who h a s  been  
convicted of a felony,  may be enl is ted in any  a r m e d  force.  Howeve r ,  t h e  Sec re t a ry  concerned 
may au thor i ze  excep t ions ,  in mer i to r ious  cases  for t h e  en l i s tmen t  of d e s e r t e r s  and persona 
convicted of felonies.  
10 U.S.C. 0 504 (1970). 
49 See Ex p a r t e  Beaver,  271 F. 493 (N.D. Ohio 1921); E x  p a r t e  Dostal, 243 F. 664 
(N.D. Ohio 1917); United Sta tes  v.  Wyngall, 44 Va. (3 Grat t . )  387 (1847); United 
S ta t e s  v.  Cottingham, 40 Va. (1 Rob.)  615 (1843). Congress has authorized the  
enlistment of aliens as  a means of securing needed linguists, skilled military spe- 
cialists and technicians. See  DAJA-AL 197214744, 31 Aug. 1972 (discussion of 
Lodge Act,  Act of June  30, 1950, Pub. L. KO. 81-597, 64 Sta t .  316 (expired J u n e  
30, 1959) ). The requirement of citizenship is covered in 10 U.S.C. 9: 3253 (1970): 
A r m y :  pe r sons  not qualif ied.  
In t ime  of peace ,  no pe r son  may be accepted for original  en l i s tmen t  in t h e  A r m y  unless  he is 
a  citizen of t h e  Uni ted S t a t e s  or  has  been lawfully admi t t ed  to t h e  Uni ted S t a t e s  fo r  pe rmanen t  
r e s idence  unde r  t h e  applicable provisions of chap te r  12 of  t i t l e  8. 
s o s e e  1u re Judge’s Peti t ion,  148 F. Supp. 80 (S.D. Cal. 1956) (servicemember 
must show that  he was insane on date  of enlistment). Enlistment of “insane” per- 
sons is prohibited by 10 U.S.C. § 504 (1970). The Comptroller General has held 
tha t  there  is no substantial  basis for regarding a servicemember as  an insane per-  
son unless he  has been the  subject of a prior judicial determination of mental in- 
competence. See 39 Comp. Gen. 742, 747 (1960). 
5 1  Courts have also dispensed with s ta tu tory  formalities where equity demands 
such. In Coe v. United Sta tes ,  44 C t .  C1. 419 (19091, t he  claimant had missed the  
deadline for receiving his s ta tu tory  reenlistment bonus because of a heavy recruit-  
ing schedule. The court ruled in his favor because he had filled out the  necessary 
paperwork before t he  t ime limit had expired.  In 111 re Agustin, 62 F. Supp. 832 
(N.D. Cal. 19451, a Filipino national (who had served the  United Sta tes  as a guer- 
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the Government; in some minority cases they a re  voidable a t  the  
instance of the  minor’s parents or guardian.52 
B. EFFECT OF REGULATORY CONTROLS 
If a soldier cannot convince a federal court that  his enlistment 
contract is invalid on statutory grounds, he can advance the  argu- 
ment that  in the process of entering into the contract a military 
regulation was violated. Despite the oft-cited rule that  the  Govern- 
ment is required to follow its own  regulation^,^^ not every regula- 
tory violation will entitle the  soldier to the relief he requests. If the  
servicemember has suffered no prejudice,54 if the regulation is not 
for his benefit,55 or if i t  appears that he has acted in bad faith,56 the  
federal courts generally will rule that  a violation of the regulation 
does not entitle him to relief. 
An example of the courts’ interpretation of regulatory controls is 
found in JohnsoTi v. Chcifee. 57 Johnson (already on active duty) had 
rilla f ighter in World War 11) was granted citizenship although the  “formal” en- 
listment o r  induction into the  United Sta tes  armed forces was lacking. Federal  
courts have also held tha t  “ the  equivalent of an enlistment” may be found where 
the  servicemember has continually served af ter  t he  removal of the  disqualifica- 
tion. See Barre t  v. Looney, 158 F. Supp. 224 ( D .  Kan. 1957), a f f d ,  252 F.2d 588 
(10th Cir . ) ,  cer’t .  d e u i e d ,  357 U.S. 940 (1958); E.r p a r t e  Hubbard,  182 F. 76, 81 (D.  
Mass. 1910). 
The Comptroller General has also found “constructive enlistments.” See  45 
Comp. Gen. 218 (1965); 40 Comp. Gen. 428 (1961) (“ratification” of a void formal 
enlistment); 39 Comp. Gen. 860, 863 (1960) (“equivalent” enlistment af ter  removal 
of disqualification). 
52 R e g u l a r  enl i s ted  m e m b e r s :  minor i ty  d ischarge .  
Upon appl ica t ion  by t h e  p a r e n t s  o r  g u a r d i a n  of  a r e g u l a r  enl i s ted  m e m b e r  of an  a r m e d  force  
t o  t h e  S e c r e t a r y  concerned wi th in  90 d a y s  a f t e r  t h e  member‘s  e n l i s t m e n t .  t h e  m e m b e r  shal l  b e  
d ischarged f o r  his o u n  convenience ,  wi th  t h e  pay and form of d ischarge  cer t i f ica te  t o  u h i c h  his 
service  e n t i t l e s  him. if- 
(1) t h e r e  is evidence  sa t i s fac tory  t o  t h e  S e c r e t a r y  concerned t h a t  t h e  m e m b e r  is u n d e r  e ipht -  
e e n  y e a r s  of a g e :  and 
12) t h e  m e m b e r  enl i s ted  wi thout  t h e  w r i t t e n  consent  of h is  p a r e n t  or g u a r d i a n .  
10 U .S .C .  % 1170 (1970). The Army‘s procedure for discharging minors is found in 
Army Reg. N o .  635-200, Personnel Separations- Enlisted Personnel,  ch. 7 (C 33, 
8 Feb.  1972) [hereinafter cited as AR 635-2001. 
53 S e e ,  e.g. ,  Vitarelli v.  Seaton, 359 U.S.  535 (1959); Harmon v. Brucker,  355 U.S. 
579 (1958); Service v. Dulles, 354 U .S .  363 (1957). See  a l so  Peck, T h e  J u s t i c e s  arid 
the Genera l s :  T h e  Sibprerrie Cozirt arid J u d i c i a l  R e v i e w  of M i l i t a r y  A c t i v i t i e s ,  70 
MIL. L. REV.  1, 33-37 (1975). 
5 4  United Sta tes  e r  r e / .  Stone v. Robinson, 431 F.2d 548 (3d Cir. 1970). 
5 5  S e e ,  e.g., Allgood v.  Kenan, 470 F.2d 617 (9th Cir.  1972) (regulation for benefit 
of Government); Silverthorne v.  Laird,  460 F.2d 1175 (5th Cir.  1972) (conscien- 
tious objector regulation for servicemember’s benefit). 
56 Wier v. United Sta tes ,  474 F.2d 617 (Ct.  C1. 1973). 
57  469 F.2d 1216 (9th Cir. 1972); accord ,  Kubitschek v. Chafee, 469 F.2d 1221 (9th 
Cir. 1972). But  see Savage v.  Middendorf, 4 Mil. L.  Rep. 2380 (Civ. N o .  75-1114- 
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signed a two-year extension agreement with the Navy whereby he 
would receive special training in a nuclear program. Contrary to 
naval requirements, Johnson’s agreement was sworn to before a 
warrant officer.58 Rejecting the argument, and the  lower court’s 
holding, that  execution of the  agreement had to comport with the 
regulations, the court found that  a “formal defect” should not defeat 
an otherwise valid agreement.59 The court continued: 
F a r  from being prejudiced from the  fact tha t  a noncommissioned 
officer accepted the  contract te rms on behalf of the  Navy, Johnson 
was  the  recipient of considerable benefits  under  t h e  agreement :  
thirty-three weeks of special training which he would not otherwise 
have received. On its  pa r t ,  the  Navy, by enrolling Johnson in t he  Nu- 
clear Field Program, manifested i ts  intent to  be bound by the exten- 
sion agreement,  regardless of any flaw existing in the  execution of t he  
contract. Thus,  even assuming for the  moment tha t  t he  notarial defect 
prevented the  parties from being legally bound a t  t he  time of signing, 
their  subsequent acts constituted a dual ratification of the  contract 
te rms .6n 
r 
A certainly different result is found in cases where the soldier has 
S, S.D. Cal. May 20, 1976), where the district court granted a writ  of habeas 
corpus to Navy servicemember who had voluntarily enlisted in the  Navy in re turn  
for dismissal of pending civilian criminal charges.  Navy recruiting regulations 
prohibited such procedures. The court frowned upon the  petitioner’s “manipula- 
tive behavior” (using the  Navy to  solve his legal problems, then using the  legal 
system to  solve his Navy problem), but focused on the  conduct of the  recruiter and 
his superiors.  Cit ing United S ta t e s  v. Russo,  23 C.M.A. 511, 50 C.M.R. 650 
(1975), see notes 120 to 126 and accompanying text  ixfrcc, the court voided the  
enlistment.  
5 8  The pertinent provision of the Naval Manual provided: 
Gei ieral .  I n  o r d e r  t o  be  cons idered  legal ani1 b inding,  p e r t i n e n t  por t ions  of t h e  .4greement  t o  
E x t e n d  E n l i s t m e n t  m u s t  b e  filled in a s  shown in E x h i b i t  1A-l of Ar t ic le  B-2311 ant1 s igned by 
both  t h e  individual  a n d  t h e  commissioned officer a d m i n i s t e r i n g  t h e  oath  on o r  p r i o r  t o  e x p i r a -  
Agreetiieii ts eli tered i n t o  , subsequer i f  t u  the  date  0.f e r p i m t i o n  o,f e n l i s t -  
r t ie i i t  a r e  ioilhout l vgo l  ,force a i i d  e f f e c t .  
469 F.2d a t  1218 n.3. 
5s The court cited United Sta tes  ex ? e / .  Stone v. Robinson, 431 F.2~1 a t  553: 
C e r t a i n l y ,  a n y  r u u t i n e  fa i lure  of appel lant  t o  s w e a r  t o  h is  execut ion  of h is  extens ion fo rm would 
not affect t h e  validit$ of t h e  e n l i s t m e n t  e x t e n s i o n ,  j u s t  a s  t h e  violation of  e v e r y  regula t ion  in 
some p a r t i c u l a r  does  not a l w a y s  inval ida te  t h e  ac t ion  t a k e n  t h e r e u n d e r .  If t h e  Regula t ion  in 
th is  ins tance  was  not complied wi th  in t h e  r e s p e c t  indica ted ,  appel lant  w a s  not pre judiced in 
a n y  way.  
469 F.2d a t  1219. 
6n I d .  The court also noted tha t  even if Johnson had neglected to  take the  oath,  his 
signature ~ v o u l d  have sufficed to bind him. See  Nixon v.  Secretary of t he  Navy, 
422 F.2d 934, 938-40 (2tl Cir. 1970); United Sta tes  e x  ve l .  Stone v. Robinson, 431 
F.2~1 548, 552 (1970). Such language indicates a depar ture  from the  pivotal impor- 
tance of t he  “oath” noted in G v i t i t l e y .  
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been inducted 61 or involuntarily activaterLfi2 The important ele- 
ment of “voluntariness” has been found lacking 63 and in those cases 
a formal defect has invalidated the government’s attempt t o  enforce 
the  induction s tatute  or the reserve agreement. 
C. BREACH OF CONTRACT 
Perhaps the strongest indication of the federal courts‘ perspective 
of the enlistment is found in those enlistment cases where an alleged 
breach has occurred. Despite an earlier reluctance to review gov- 
ernment activities in general, the federal courts do consider the  
merits of the servicemember‘s arguments and show a disposition to 
void enlistments where a material breach is The breach of 
contract argument can arise in various ways. I t  has, for instance, 
been raised by reservists who have been involuntarily activated, 
whether as  a result of presidential direction or because of repeated 
acts of misconduct while in reserve status.65 Relief is usually sought 
on the  argument that  the Government has illegally modified the con- 
tract.  
An example of involuntary activation can be found in P f i l e  c. 
C o r . c o ~ o ~ .  66 The enlistment contract provided that  t he  enlistee 
could be ordered to active duty for training for a maximum period of 
forty-five clays if a t  any time he failed to perform satisfactorily. 
After the contract was entered, Congress increased the period of 
required active duty to twenty-four months. 67 Pfile subsequently 
missed the required summer camp and was ordered to active duty 
for two years. His argument, that Congress could not change the 
te rms  of his original enlistment contract, was rejected. A contract 
of this type,  the court noted, “always stands in the shadow of the  
61 Billings v .  Truestlale, 321 U.S. 542 (1944); United Sta tes  v .  Mellis. 59 F. Supp. 
682 ( M . D . S . C .  1945) (distinguishing B i i l i ~ g s ) .  S e e  ctlso Mayborn v.  Heflebotver. 
145 F.2d 864 (5th Cir.  1944). 
62 Konn v ,  Lai rd ,  460 F.2tl is18 (7 th  Cir .  1972) (unexcused absences which 
prompted activation were  improperly assessed against reservist) .  However,  fail- 
u r e  of t he  service to  follow its  o\vn regulations was not fatal in White v.  Callaway, 
501 F.2d 672 (5th Cir. 19741, or in  Alston v.  Schlesinger, 368 F. Supp. 537 ( D .  
Mass. 1974). A discussion of involuntary activation is found in Dilloff, I i i  w / i o / f u  t,!/ 
A c t i ~ n t i o i i  yf Reserc>ists ,  63 KY. L . J .  895 (1975). 
63 The voluntary ent ry  sets enlistments apar t  from inductions. Bro\vn v .  McSam- 
ara ,  387 F.2~1 150, 152 ( 3 d  Cir.  1967). 
64 B l ~ f  s e e  United Sta tes  e.r v e i .  Lewis v.  Laird,  337 F.  Supp. 118. 120 (S .D.  Ill. 
1972), ivhere t he  court doubted tha t  extraordinary relief tvould be available to  
obtain review of an alleged breach of t he  enlistment contract by the Government. 
65 S e e  note 62 and accompanying t e s t  sicpi.n.  
6 7  Act of June  :30. 1967. Pub. L .  N o .  90-40, 5 i i ( l ) ,  81 Stat .  105. 
287 F. Supp. 554 ( D .  Colo. 1968). 
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exercise by Congress of positive paramount sovereign powers.” 68 
The “sovereign powers” in this case were the congressional war  
pourers.69 
The breach of contract argument is usually raised where the serv- 
icemember alleges that  his enlistment options were not fulfilled. 
Illustrative of the  trend of the federal courts in this area is Bei)tis v. 
Whalen.’O The petitioner, Bemis, sought a discharge from the Ma- 
rine Corps on the grounds of false representations and breach of 
contract. He  had enlisted after being guaranteed a military occupa- 
tional specialty (MOS) in electronics. He  was, in the  words of the 
court, also desirous of completing his military obligation and being 
able to take advantage of educational benefits under the G.I. Bill. 
The military made a mistake and Bemis was extensively trained in a 
different MOS as a telephonekeletype technician. The er ror  was 
discovered and Bemis was assigned to a school for training in the  
original specialty. Seeking relief, he nonetheless took his cause to  
federal court and sought his discharge. 
The court, relying on Grittileg, defined an enlistment a s  a “con- 
t ract  between the United States  and the  enlistee [that] in the ab- 
sence of supervening statute ,  is governed by general principles of 
contract law [and] a party induced by fraud or  mistake to enter  into 
a contract may rescind tha t  contract. . . .” Using repeated con- 
tractual references such as  “contractual obligations” and “benefit of 
bargain,” the court ruled that  Bemis was in fact receiving what he 
had bargained for. Because time was not of the  essence in receiving 
the  guaranteed training, there was no material breach of c o n t r a ~ t . ’ ~  
287 F. Supp. at  561. 
69See U.S. CONST. a r t .  I ,  $ 8, cl. 11 (power to declare war);  id. cl. 12 (power to 
raise and support  armies);  id. el. 14 (power to make rules for the  government and 
regulation of t he  land and naval forces). S e e  niso Antonuk v. United Sta tes ,  445 
F.2d 592 (6th Cir. 19711, where t he  court ,  in declaring that  a reservist  could be 
activated notwithstanding clauses in his enlistment contract  to  t he  contrary ,  
s ta ted:  
H e r e ,  t h e  poss ib le  d e t r i m e n t  t o  t h e  individual  is g r e a t .  If t h e  ac t iva t ion  o r d e r  is upheld ,  h is  
l i b e r t y  will be s igni f icant ly  l imi ted  hy m i l i t a t y  discipline. atid t h e r e  is a s igni f icant  r i s k  t h a t  h e  
might  h e  wounded in b a t t l e  or e v e n  killed. But  a t  t h e  s a m e  t ime.  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t a l  i n t e r e s t  in 
ra is ing  a n  a r m y  h a s ,  wi thout  except ion ,  been considered  by t h e  c o u r t s  t o  he p a r a m o u n t .  T h u s  
t h e  o r d i n a r y  balancing t e s t s  a r e  r e n d e r e d  a lmost  i r r e l e v a n t  by  t h e  t r a n s c e n d e n t  i m p o r t a n c e  of  
t h e  w a r  p o w e r .  
Id. a t  594 (citations omitted). 
‘ O  341 F. Supp. 1289 (S.D. Cal. 197”). 
‘l I d .  a t  1291. 
72 The “material breach” requirement was also relied upon in rejecting a serv- 
iceman’s request  for recission of his enlistment contract in Crane v.  Coleman, 389 
F. Supp. 22 (E .D .  Pa.  1975). In  tha t  case t he  servicemember claimed tha t  he had 
not received allotments as  promised. The court reasoned tha t  the  breach was not 
19 
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A material breach of contract was found in Novnk v.  Ruwsfeld. 7 3  
Novak enlisted in the  Navy in December 1974 for a period of four 
years and shortly thereafter executed a two-year extension contract 
for the purpose of attaining eligibility for the Nuclear Field Train- 
ing Program. During a preparatory six-week refresher course, he 
experienced “scholastic difficulties” and was dismissed from the  
program. When he was subsequently assigned to a clerical position 
he requested a discharge from the Navy. His request was denied. 
In  granting the  servicemember’s petition for a writ of habeas cor- 
pus, the court noted that  Novak had entered into both the original 
enlistment contract and the  extension agreement because of the op- 
portunity for advanced training. 74 By not providing the promised 
training, the Navy, according to the court, had materially breached 
not only the extension agreement but also the original enlistment 
agreement .75  The  court  fu r the r  noted tha t  t h e  Navy had not 
so material and substantial in na ture  tha t  it affected the  essence of t he  contract 
and defeated the  object of t he  parties.  I n  Hayes v.  Secretary of Defense, 515 F.2d 
668 (D.C. Cir. 1975), the  court rejected a breach of contract argument.  The serv-  
icemember had not received a promised military intelligence assignment.  The 
court examined the  enlistment contract and determined tha t  t he  Government had 
properly reassigned him. He had not “qualified” for t he  position-a condition pre- 
cedent specifically provided for in the  contract. And in United Sta tes  e x  ? , e / .  
Roman v. Schlesinger, 404 F. Supp. 77 (E.D.N.Y.  1975), the  servicemember \vas 
deemed to  have waived the  equitable relief of recission because he had waited 
almost a year af ter  discovering tha t  he was not going to receive the  schooling 
indicated in his enlistment contract. The servicemember in Matzelle v .  P ra t t ,  332 
F. Supp. 1010 (E.D.  \‘a. 1971) was also denied relief. Government delay (several  
days) in paying a lump sum bonus was not a material breach. The court noted tha t  
the  servicemember was more interested in rescinding his enlistment contract than 
in receiving the  money. The case contains a good discussion of the  remedy of re- 
cission. 
7 4  There is no indication whether Kovak‘s motives for originally enlisting were  
ever  incorporated into t he  enlistment contract or i ts  annexes. Normally, t he  s e w -  
icemember is bound by the  “Statements of Understanding” absent a showing of 
fraud. Chalfant v. Laird,  420 F.2d 945 (9th Cir. 1969). Oral promises a r e  not bind- 
ing on the  Government. Jackson v.  United Sta tes ,  551 F.2tl 282 (Ct .  C1. 1975). 
Nonetheless the  court seemed content in sett ing aside the  original contract on the  
basis of t he  servicemember’s allegations concerning his motives for executing i t .  
7 5  Navy regulations provided tha t  extension agreements could be set  aside if 
promised benefits were not provided. But no provisions were cited which allowed 
the  servicemember to  avoid the original enlistment contract. The court distin- 
guished Nison v.  Secretary of h’avy, 422 F.2d 934 (2d Cir. 19G0), where t he  serv- 
icemember had received substantially all of his promised benefits before seeking 
rec iss ion.  T h e  cou r t  made no ment ion of i t s  e a r l i e r  decision in Quinn v .  
Schlesinger, 4 Mil. L .  Rep. 2383 ( S o .  C-75-1670 WHO, N . D .  Cal. Dec. 2 2 ,  1 9 i 5 )  
(oral opinion). In Q u O o ~  the  naval servicemember had enlisted for service on the 
West Coast. When he was assigned to Okinawa, he sought and \vas denied a dis- 
charge. After he insti tuted judicial proceedings, he was assigned to San Diego. 
The court ,  in granting the  petition for a writ of habeas corpus, distinguished 
423 F .  Supp. 971 (N.D. Cal. 1976). 
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adequately informed Novak of the rigorous program requirements. 
No mention was made of any possible justification for the  “breach” 
by the Government.76 
Relief under contract principles was also granted to the  serv- 
icemember in Larioiioff  v. United States.77 In  Larionoff the  
petitioner enlisted in June  1969 for a period of four years. In July 
1969 he executed an agreement to extend his period of service by 
two years for the  purpose of serving in a critical military skill and in 
consideration of the “pay, allowances, and benefits which will accrue 
. . . during the  continuance of [his] service.” 78 
When Larionoff signed the  extension agreement the Government 
was offering variable reenlistment bonuses (VRB’s) which he 
would receive upon the  commencement of the  extended period of 
service. However, in July 1972 (while he was still serving under his 
original four-year enlistment) the  Navy discontinued the  payment of 
VRB’s for the  critical military skill in which Larionoff was qualified. 
When he commenced his two-year extension of service, he was paid 
the Regular Reenlistment Bonus. 
Larionoff was joined by other servicemembers in a class action 
suit brought under the  Tucker Act 8o to recover amounts allegedly 
due under the VRB’s. The federal district court granted relief and 
declared that  if the servicemembers were bound to the reenlistment 
contracts from the time of their execution, then mutuality of agree- 
ment required that  the Government also be bound by its promise to 
pay the bonuses. The court noted that  the language of the contract 
must be considered in light of the situation and relationship of the  
parties, the circumstances surrounding them a t  the  time of the con- 
tract,  the nature of the subject matter ,  and the purpose of the con- 
tract.  Here, because the servicemembers had relied upon the in- 
Benzis 2) .  Whalen because of the  delay in receiving the  promised benefits. 
76 The Statement of Understanding provided in par t :  “To remain eligible for t he  
one year  formal nuclear training, personnel must continually display excellent 
military performance and demonstrate t he  academic potential to  complete Nuclear 
Power School by standing in the  upper two-thirds of the i r  basic “A” School class.” 
The court did not read this provision as  requiring academic “excellence” a t  the  
preschool although i t  might be argued tha t  t he  Navy was justified in dismissing 
Novak for failure to  “continually display excellent military performance’’ (posting 
below average grades  in the preschool). 
7 7  365 F. Supp.140 (D.D.C. 1973), af f ‘d ,  533 F.2d 1167 (D.C. Cir. 1976), u f f d ,  97 
S.Ct .  2151 (1977). 
78 365 F. Supp. a t  144. 
79 The circuit court reviewed the  early s ta tu tes  providing for monetary bonuses. 
See 533 F.2d 1167, 1173 nn. 16 & 17 (D.C. Cir. 1976). 
so 28 U.S.C. D 1346(a)(2) (1970). 
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ducement of the  bonus and because the Government hatl received 
the  bargained-for services from the enlistees, the Government was 
bound to pay the vested bonuses to those who hatl signed their con- 
tracts for extension prior to the Navy's announced termination of 
the VRB's in March 1972. 
The decision was affirmed by the circuit court.81 In  its affirmance 
t h e  court  rejected t h e  government 's  a rgument  t h a t  t h e  serv-  
icemembers were entitled only to the VRB (if any) in effect when 
they actually entered into the  period of extended service. I t  ac- 
cepted the servicemembers' argument that  they hatl signed their 
extension contracts in consideration of, among other things, t he  
VRB. The court further noted: 
The Government authored those  extensions contracts,  antl it could 
easily have inserted a provi&n limiting an enlisted member's V R B  
eligibility to the  award level in effect on the  date  of actual ent ry  into 
the  period of extended service. Undoubtedly, if such a provision had 
been included, the  S a v y  would have witnessed fewer extensions of 
enlistment.  But there  is no express limitation on eligibility, antl t he  
therefore bound by the  actual contract te rms and the  
t a ry  regulations.s2 
Continuing, the court held tha t  servicemembers who hatl signed 
their extension agreements prior to congressional termination of the 
VRB's in 1974 were also entitled to their bonuses: 
Since contrac tual  r i gh t s  agains t  t h e  government  a r e  p rope r ty  
interests protected by the  Fifth Amendment,  Congressional power to  
a b r o g a t e  e x i s t i n g  g o v e r n m e n t  c o n t r a c t s  i s  n a r r o w l y  c i r -  
cumscribed. , . . And although Congress may constitutionally impair 
existing contract r ights in the  exercise of a paramount governmental 
power such as the  "War Powers," . . . Congress is "without power to 
v e d i t c e  e . i ' p e v c / i t u i . e s  by abrogat ing  contractual obligations of t h e  
United Sta tes ."  84 
Because the court could find no basis in the legislative history to 
establish tha t  Congress was exercising some paramount power 
which might justify abrogation of existing contract rights,  the  con- 
tractual entitlement to  the VRB stood unimpaired. 
The Supreme Court,  in a five-to-four decision, affirmed the circuit 
court's decision.85 However, the Court based i ts  decision on con- 
gressional control over military pay and did not t rea t  the  serv- 
533 F.2d 1167 ( D . C .  Cir.  1976): accord  Caola v .  United Sta tes ,  404 F. Supp. 
1101 ( D .  Conn. 1975). 
333 F.2d at  1178 (footnote omitted).  
83 .4ct of May 10, 1974, Pub. L .  N o .  93-277, % 2611, 88 Sta t .  119. 
84  533 F.%d a t  1179 (citations omitted). 
97 s. Ct .  21.51 (1977). 
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icemembers’ claims as  contractual. 86 Justice Brennan, writing for 
the majority, reviewed the legislative history of the VRB’s and con- 
cluded: 
The clear intention of Congress t o  enact a program tha t  “concen- 
t r a t e s  monetary  awards  a t  t h e  first  re-enlistment decision point 
where the  grea tes t  re turns  per  retention dollar can be expected,” 
could only be effectuated if t he  enlisted member a t  the decision point 
had some certainty about t he  incentive being offered. Instead,  the  
challenged regulations provided for a virtual lottery.  We therefore 
hold tha t  insofar as t he  Defense Department regulations required 
tha t  the  amount of the  VRB to  be paid to  a servicemember who was 
otherwise eligible to  receive one be determined by the  award level as  
of the  time he began to  serve  his extended enlistment,  they a re  in 
clear conflict with the  congressional intention in enacting the  VRB 
program, and hence invalid.87 
Consequently, Larionoff and the members of his class were enti- 
tled to bonuses computed a t  the level in effect when they agreed to  
extend their enlistments. Likewise, those who had agreed to, but  
had not actually commenced their periods of extended service prior 
to congressional termination of the VRB’s in 1974 were entitled to  
bonuses computed a t  the level in effect when they agreed to  extend 
their enlistments. The Court predicated this holding on the fact that  
nothing in the language of the 1974 Act expressed an intention t o  
affect the rights of servicemembers who had previously extended 
their enlistments.88 
L c c ~ i o ) / ~ l f  does reinforce the  line of cases which have t reated 
“[Tlhe rights of the  affected service members must be determined by refrrence 
to the  s ta tu tes  and regulations governing the  VRB,  ra ther  than to ordinary con- 
t rac t  principles. 45 U.S.L.W. a t  4651 (citation and footnote omitted).  
87 I d .  a t  4654. Mr. Justice White, in a dissent in which Chief Justice Burger and 
Justices Blackmun and Rehnyuist joined, noted tha t  those a h o  had executed re -  
enlistment agreements had no vested right to any particular pay,  allowance, o r  
benefit and tha t  any cancellation of the  VRB prior to the  commencement of t he  
extended period of service was not forbidden by law. I d .  a t  4655. The Court  noted 
tha t  a constant theme in the  hearings,  committee repor ts ,  and the  floor debates 
was the  argument tha t  t he  VRB would be effective as  an inducement to reenlist 
because i t  would be provided a t  t he  “decision point.” I d .  a t  n.17. In this case 
Larionoffs decision point was in 1969 when he executed both his enlistment and 
extension agreements.  
The Court  noted tha t  i ts  decision on this point was in conflict with t he  circuit 
court opinions in Collins v.  Rumsfeld, 542 F.2d 1109 (9th Cir. 197G), vacated sub 
nom. Saylors v. United Sta tes ,  45 U.S.L.W. 3818 (June  21, 1977) and Carini v. 
United Sta tes ,  528 F.2d 738 (4th Cir. 19751, vaca ted ,  45 U.S.L.W.  3818 (June 21, 
1977), where the  courts had eyuated bonuses to  o ther  forms of pay controlled by 
Congress and found no basis for holding tha t  t he  right to  t he  bonuses had accrued 
before t he  1974 Act. The decisions seemed to res t  on the  traditional proposition 
tha t  the  Congress,  in exercise of i t s  paramount powers, could exercise a g rea t  
deal of control over questions of military pay. 
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areas of pay and other monetary benefits as questions of s tatute  and 
not contract. The decision should therefore be limited to  its facts 
and should not be construed as  a rejection of the growing body of 
law which views the soldier-state relationship as a matter  of con- 
tract.  
D. SUAVMARY 
The federal courts still pay the necessary homage to the Supreme 
Court’s opinion in Uizited States v. Griwley .  Yet,  there is a trend 
away from language in G1-iiuley which indicated that  “no breach of 
t he  contract destroys the new status.  . . . ”  Grimley ,  of course, 
dealt only with the criminal aspects of an enlistment contract. Con- 
temporary federal courts a re  dealing primarily with the civil as- 
pects,  namely questions of contract performance. Cases such as 
Novak u.  Rums.feld may portend widespread abrogation of enlist- 
ment contracts where the Government has materially breached the  
agreement. Whether the federal courts on the whole will a t  some 
point completely disregard the  peculiar status-creating nature of 
the enlistment contract and treat  both the Government and serv- 
icemember as  private parties remains to be seen.sg That approach 
has been suggested.g0 
V. THE MILITARY PERSPECTIVE: 
THE ENLISTMENT 
IS PRIMARILY A CHANGE O F  STATUS 
While a t  first blush there would not seem to  be any variance, 
there are important distinctions in the approaches taken by the  fed- 
eral courts and the  military judicial system. As noted in the preced- 
ing section, the federal courts generally utilize principles of contract 
law when determining the  validity of an enlistment agreement. The 
military courts do However, the administrative opinions rend- 
ered by the  Army’s Judge Advocate General 92 do indicate some 
89 Adams v. Clifford, 254 F .  Supp. 1318 (D.  Hawaii 1965). Once formed, t he  par- 
ticular s ta tus  is not  easily set  aside. Illegality or material breach must be shown. 
S e e ,  e . y . ,  1~ re Green, 156 F. Supp. 174 (S.D. Cal. 1557). 
Dilloff, A Coi i tmctn~nI  A n a l y s i s  of the Military Eiii is t i i ient ,  8 U. RICH. L.  
R E V.  121 (1974). 
In this article a distinction is made between federal courts and the  military 
courts.  The former are  established pursuant t o  Article I11 of the United Sta tes  
Constitution. The la t te r  a r e  formed under the  provisions of Article I ,  § 8 of t he  
United S ta t  e s Constitution . 
92 For  purposes of this article, the  term “The Judge Advocate General” will be 
used t o  designate The Judge Advocate General of the  Army. 
24 
19771 THE ENLISTMENT CONTRACT 
application of contract principles. The distinctions in the positions of 
the  military courts, the  Office of The Judge Advocate General, and 
the  federal courts have not always been so clear. 
A .  THE MILITARY AND FEDERAL 
ONE AND THE SALVE 
Because early courts-martial were not subject to judicial review 
within the military,93 there  is no early military judicial position on 
the  question of enlistments. However,  military t reat ises  94 and 
opinions by the Office of The Judge Advocate General of the  Army 
provide a rich source of material which reveal the early military 
approaches to  enlistments. 
The treatises a re  instructive. Colonel Winthrop’s coverage of the 
area seems thorough and closely linked to the  federal perspective. 
Who influenced whom is not clear.95 One thing is clear: until the  
middle of the  twentieth century the military departments consid- 
ered enlistment contracts to  be personal service contracts. The en- 
listment contract was peculiar, but it was nonetheless a contract to 
be interpreted by application of contract law. 
The early military position was comparable to  that  taken by the  
Supreme Court and lower federal courts when faced with an irregu- 
lar enlistment. Drawing heavily from both s ta te  and federal deci- 
sions, the military writers and the Army’s Judge Advocate General 
followed those decisions almost to the letter:  
a .  Sta tutory requirements were for the  benefit of the  
Government and a statutorily defective enlistment was 
voidable, not void, unless the  enlistee was without 
legal capacity to contract by reason of intoxication, in- 
sanity or youth.96 
b. Contravention of military regulations did not per se af- 
fect the  validity of the  contract. The contract would be 
voidable. 97 
PERSPECTIVES- 
93 A convicted servicemember could seek a writ of habeas corpus 011 t he  basis t ha t  
his court-martial lacked jurisdiction to  t ry  him. See Dynes v. Hoover, F1 U.S. (20 
How.) 65 (1858). 
W.  WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW A N D  PRECEDENTS (2d ed .  1920 reprint) .  
95 Winthrop’s work was cited numerous times by the  federal courts,  and in a t  least  
one case Winthrop was a counsel of record.  See I J ~  re McVey, 23 F. 878 (D. Cal. 
1885). 
96 W. WINTHROP, s u p r a  note 94, a t  545. B u f  see note 102 and accompanying t e s t  
i n f r a .  
9 7  G. DAVIS, s u p r a  note 94, a t  349; W. WINTHROP, s i c p ~ n  note 94, a t  546. 
94 G. DAVIS, A TREATISE ON THE MILITARY LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (1898); 
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c. Once a contract was entered into, a breach by the en- 
l i s tee  would not automatical ly void t h e  cont rac t .  
Likewise, the Executive could not materially alter the  
terms of the contract authorized by Congress.ss 
These general principles varied little until the post-World War I1 
years when Congress, in reorganizing the military judicial system, 
created an appellate judicial tribunal to review c ~ u r t s - m a r t i a l . ~ ~  
B. THE FEDERAL VIEW A N D  THE iWILITARY 
VIEW: A PARTING OF THE WAYS 
The new United States Court of Military Appeals was soon con- 
fronted with the enlistment questions which the  federal and state  
courts had reviewed many times during the preceding 150 years. 
The court, citing the rationale of G)+nley,  reiterated that  an en- 
listment is a contract which gives rise to a status.loo In  Uirited 
States u.  B l a ) i t o ~  l o l  the accused had enlisted a t  the age of fourteen 
years and went AWOL one clay before his sixteenth birthday. Ac- 
cording to  the court, his enlistment was void lo* because he had a t  
no time served in the Army when he was legally competent to  do 
The Government's argument, that  the minimum age require- 
ment was for the benefit of the Government, was rejected. The 
capacity of a minor to change his s tatus,  the court stated, had been 
limited by statute.lo4 In language which set the  tone for things to  
come the  court noted: 
An agreement to enlist in an armed service ia often referred to  as a 
G. DAVIS, s u p m  note 94, a t  349; W. WINTHROP, s ~ p m  note 94. at  547. 
The United Sta tes  Court  of Military Appeals was established by the  Uniform 
Code of Military Jus t ice ,  Act of May 5 ,  1950, ch. 169 ( a r t .  6 '9,  64 S ta t .  129 
(codified in 10 U.S.C. $ 867 (1970) ). 
l oo  United Sta tes  v. Downs, 3 C.M.A. 90, 11 C.M.R.  90 (1953). 
l o l  7 C.M.A. 664, 23 C.M.R. 128 (1957). 
l o 2  In  Blnti tot i  t h e  Governmen t  a rgued  t h a t  a t  t h e  mos t ,  t h e  minor  s e r v -  
icemember's enlistment was "voidable." That position reflected a longstanding 
policy which had been asserted by the  framers of the  1928 and 1949 Manuals for 
Courts-Martial and the Army's Judge Advocate General. See  JAG 250 .4 ,  11 May 
1918, as d iges t ed  i n  DIG. OPS. JAG 1912-1940 $ 359(c)(3), at  163; M A N U A L  FOR 
COURTS-MARTIAL, U .  S. A R M Y ,  1928, para .  157; MANEAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, 
U.S. A RMY,  1949, para.  189. There was no such referenee in the  1951 Manual for 
Courts-Martial. Army Reg. 615-362, para.  15 (14 July 194T), provided tha t  com- 
manders could review the  enlistment of a minor and use discretion in retaining or 
discharging him. That provision was rescinded in Army Reg. (315-362. para. 15 (14 
July  1948). 
lo* The court virtually ignored the  massive body of federal law ( G r i m / e g  and Mor,-  
tissey's progeny) which had applied contract principles in determining the  validity 
of enlistment contracts. 
10 U.S.C. 5 3256 (1956) (repealed 1968). 
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contract .  However,  more than a contractual relationship is estab- 
lished. What is really created is a s ta tus .  As a resul t ,  no useful pur- 
pose is  served by reviewing the  common-law rules of contract and 
whether the contract of a minor is ,  under t he  common law, voidable a t  
his election and in his own time, with or without formal proceedings. 
The United Sta tes  Supreme Court  has emphasized tha t  t he  “age a t  
which an infant shall be competent to do any acts or perform any 
duties, military or civil, depends wholly upon the  Legislature.” We 
must,  therefore,  look to the  s ta tu tes  to determine whether Congress 
has established a minimum age a t  which a person is deemed incapable 
of changing his s ta tus  to tha t  of a member of the military establish- 
ment.  lo5  
Later  opinions of that  court specifically cite the B l n ~ t o ~  pinion for 
the proposition that  “[elnlistment in the armed forces cloes not es- 
tablish a contract relationship between the individual and the Gov- 
ernment, but a status.“ lo6 The court has continued to  emphasize 
that  point. lo7 
What effect, if any, cloes the difference in approach to enlistments 
have? If the  enlistment contract is viewed as  a voluntary agreement 
which changes s t a tu s  but  nonetheless creates  a contractual or 
quasi-contractual relationship, then broader principles of contract 
law may be applied to determine both the existence of an agreement 
and the  parties‘ respective rights and obligations under such an 
agreement. If,  on the  other hand, the  enlistment is viewed primar- 
ily as  a voluntary change of s tatus from civilian to soldier, then the  
statutory requirements which control the  process of effecting this 
“change“ become the operative legal principles and other concepts 
7 C.M.A. a t  665, 23 C.M.R. a t  129. 
United S ta t e s  v.  Hout,  19 C.M.A. 299, 41 C.M.R. 299 (1970). S e e  also  United 
Sta tes  v. Anderson, 51 C.M.R. 45 (A.F.C.M.R. 1975). 
lo’ Through this opinion and in many others which followed, t he  Court  of Military 
Appeals has emphasized the  word “s ta tus”  when citing the  familiar language from 
GTimley.  See, e.g., notes 118, 119 & 120 and accompanying text  ztifrfm. See also  
Taylor v. Reasor,  19 C.M.A. 40.5, 42 C.M.R. 7 (1970); United Sta tes  v.  Noyd, 18 
C.M.A. 483, 40 C.M.R. 195 (1969); United Sta tes  v. Anderson, 51 C.M.R. 45 
(A.F.C.M.R.  1975). The military courts’ view of the  enlistment as primarily a 
change of “s ta tus”  seems especially strong in those cases where an accused serv-  
icemember argues tha t  because his te rm of agreed service has passed, the  court- 
martial has no jurisdiction. Perhaps  the  courts fear tha t  viewing the  enlistment a s  
a contract will s t rengthen the  servicemember‘s argument.  If so,  tha t  fear is un- 
founded. The enlistment contract provides tha t  the  t e rms  of the agreement a r e  
also governed by s ta tu tes  and regulations. See  Goldstein v.  Clifford, 290 F. Supp. 
275, 279 (D .N . J .  1968). Controlling s ta tu tes  and regulations provide for court-  
martial jurisdiction over persons whose term of enlistment has expired.  See ,  e.g. ,  
10 U.S.C. 0 803 (1970); note 170 and accompanying text  iiifra. The fact tha t  in 
certain cases s ta tus  may continue past  the  term provided for in the enlistment 
contract  does not compel t he  conclusion tha t  no contractual relationship has 
existed between the  Government and the  servicemember. 
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tend to become obscured. Under such a "status' '  analysis, if the  
statutory and regulatory requirements are not met ,  the enlistment 
may be ruled invalid because the Government has failed to  follow its 
own regulations. A brief overview of the  military position confirms 
this. The military's judicial and administrative opinions tend to  fall 
within two major areas: 
a.  Those cases where the enlistment contract was ese-  
cuted in contravention of s tatutes  or military regula- 
tions, and 
b. Those cases where a "breach" (by either party) of the  
enlistment contract has taken place. 
C .  ENLISTMENTS VIOLATING STATUTES 
OR REGULATIONS 
Most statutory irregularities a re  found in the category of minority 
enlistments. lo* In cases where the validity of a minority enlistment 
has been raised, the military courts and The Judge Advocate Gen- 
eral have followed the Blanton rationale that  Congress has promul- 
gated the standards for changing status from civilian to soldier.1o3 
By looking exclusively a t  t he  s ta tu tory  formalities required to  
change an individual's status, the courts and The Judge Advocate 
General have not given adequate attention to  Mowissey 's  reliance 
The following a re  minority enlistment cases: United S ta t e s  v .  Graham, 22 
C.M.A. 75, 46 C.M.R. 75 (1972); United Sta tes  v. Lenoir, 18 C.M.A. 387, 40 
C.M.R. 99 (1969); United Sta tes  v. Bean, 13 C.M.A. 203, 32 C.M.R. 203 (1962) 
(numerous citations to  minority enlistment cases);  United Sta tes  v.  Scot t ,  11 
C.M.A. 655, 29 C . X . R .  471 (1960); United Sta tes  v. Overton,  9 C.M.A. 684, 26 
C.M.R. 464 (1958); United Sta tes  v. Reese,  9 C.M.A. 205, 25 C.M.R. 467 (1958); 
United S ta t e s  v.  Howard, 51 C.M.R.  371 (A.F.C.M.R. 1975); United Sta tes  v.  
Garback, 50 C.M.R. 673 (A.C.M.R. 1975); United Sta tes  v. Brodigan, 50 C.M.R. 
419 (N.C.M.R.  1975); United Sta tes  v. McNeal, 49 C.M.R. 668 (A.C.M.R. 1974) 
(minor enlisted while in reform school); United Sta tes  v. Alston, 48 C.M.R. 733 
(A .F .C .X.R .  1974); United S ta t e s  v .  Mills, 44 C.M.R.  460 (A.C.M.R.  1971); 
United Sta tes  v.  Liggins, 43 C.M.R. 534 (A.C.M.R. 1970); United Sta tes  v.  Wil- 
liams, 39 C.M.R.  471 (A .B .R .  1968) (although void minority enlistment may be 
converted t o  voidable enlistment a t  age seventeen, here  there  was insufficient 
indication of constructive enlistment where accused served for only five days af ter  
seventeenth birthday before going AWOL); United Sta tes  v.  Graves,  39 C.M.R. 
438 (A.B.R. 1968) (discussion of federal minority cases); United Sta tes  v. F a n t ,  25 
C . M . R .  643 ( A . B . R .  1958); Uni ted  S ta t e s  v .  DeGraffenreitl, 23 C . M . R .  659 
(N .B .R .  1957). 
1"9 See, e . g . ,  DAJA-AL 197615073, 30 July  1976 (statutory qualifications regarding 
age). The Secretary of the  Army may prohibit or restrict  individuals from enlist- 
ing except in those cases where a person is granted a s ta tu tory  right to  enlist. For 
example, he may temporarily restrict  enlistment of persons who a re  not high 
school graduates .  See DAJA-AL 197614895. 21 June  1976. 
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on the fact that  Congress had authorized sixteen-year olds to "con- 
tract" with the military."O 
the accused was a Canadian who 
had fradulently represented himself to be a United States citizen 
when he enlisted. The Army Board of Review rejected the  defense 
argument that  the accused had been incompetent to enlist because 
he was not a citizen as  required by the statute.  According to the  
board, Robson was presumed to  be competent to enlist; therefore, 
the Blaiitoyl rationale did not apply and the  accused was subject to 
court-martial jurisdiction. In  i ts  holding the board recognized that  
in the  past ,  Congress had permitted enlistment of a limited number 
of aliens under specific conditions.l12 
Statutory language prohibiting enlistment of persons who a re  in- 
toxicated 113 was not seen as  a disability in U?zited States v. Ju- 
Ziaii. 114 When confronted with arguments that  the enlistment was 
void, the  court said: 
In  U?iited States v. RobsoTi 
We need not answer  any of these precise questions as  all a r e  prem- 
ised upon the  illegality of an enlistment of an intoxicated person. We 
do not hold tha t  such enlistments a r e  either void or void a b  i i i i f io  as  
claimed. We find it unnecessary t o  examine the  fineness of t he  con- 
tentions. 
As we conceive the  argument  brought here the  question for our 
consideration is not to determine the  legality, vel non  of a contract of 
enlistment regular on i ts  face, but whether the court below possessed 
the  legal power to t r y  appellant for his military offenses because ap- 
pellant was in uc fua l  service.  This is what t he  trial judge found even 
conceding the  fact t ha t  he found the  accused was intoxicated a t  the  
time he was enlisted. 
Appellant's enlistment contract having been executed,  albeit ac- 
complished as he now contends, while intoxicated, it does not follow 
that  he can escape either his court-martial o r  i ts  ~ e n a 1 t y . l ~ ~  
l l "  The Supreme Court  s ta ted:  "The age a t  which an infant shall be competent to  
(lo any acts or perform any duties,  military o r  civil, depends wholly upon the  
Legislature." 137 U.S. a t  139. Considering the fact tha t  the  Court  was speaking to  
t he  question of the validity of contracts of enlistment, t he  above language implies 
tha t  Congress hat1 authorized sixteen-year-olds to enter  enlistment c o i i f r n c f s .  
And in United Sta tes  v .  Williams, 302 U.S. 46 (1937), the Supreme Court  s ta ted  
tha t  by enacting legislation governing enlistments,  Congress had declared who 
was capable of making coi(ft,crcf.s to  en t e r  military service. 
1 1 *  10 U.S.C. 5 621c (1930) (Lotlge Act) (expired June  30, 1959). The current s ta t -  
u t e  is 10 U.S.C.  ii 525.1 (1978). S e e  o l s o  note 49 s x p m .  The court believed tha t  the  
s ta tu te  embotlietl the  policy tha t  military service will, in general ,  be performed by 
citizens ra ther  than foreign mercenaries. 
1 1 3  10 U.S.C. 8 504 (1970). 
1 1 4  43 C.M.R. 870 (N.C.3T.R.  1971). 
1 1 5  I d .  at 877. 
24 C.M.R.  376 (A.B.R.  1937). 
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The rationale for sustaining jurisdiction rested on the. policy that  
once a soldier commits a crime, the validity of his enlistment cannot 
be used as  a bar  to jurisdiction.116 
Recent cases have considered the effect of violations of regula- 
tions during the enlistment process. Almost all aspects of the  en- 
listment procedure a re  now covered by regulations.l17 A quick re- 
view of the  pertinent regulations reveals many possibilities for 
claiming that  an enlistment is invalid because the military did not 
follow its own regulations. The principal cases dealing with this con- 
tention are the  Court of Military Appeals' decisions in Uuited States  
u .  C a t l o w ,  118 Cruited Stcrtes v. B r o 2 ~ 1 1 , ~ ~ ~  and Uttited S f a t e s  L'. 
I L 6  The court was making a distinction between d e  jcrrcio service antl t ie, j ici ,e s e n -  
ice. In doing so it fell in line with the  federal opinions which either made the  
distinction or  simply decided tha t  pending charges temporarily mooted the  issue of 
validity of t he  enlistment.  N o  mention was made of t he  concept of "constructive 
enlistments."  See note 227 i t / , i " ~ ! ,  S e e  Iii re McVey, 23 F. 878 ( D .  Cal. 18853; note 
4.5 and accompanying text  srcprn. 
I L 7  The basic Army regulation governing enlistments in Army Reg. N o .  601-210, 
Regular Army Enlistment Program (15 Jan.  1975). I t  spells out in detail hoa. en- 
listments a r e  to  be effected antl where necessary,  refers the reader  to  the  o ther  
regulations governing the  processing of recruits .  See ,  e , q . ,  Army Reg, N o .  611-5, 
Army Personnel Tests il Oct. 1975); Army Reg. No.  340-18-7, Maintenance anti 
Disposition of Military Personnel Functional Files (14 Aug. 19ti9); Army Reg. No .  
601-2770, Armed Forces Examining antl Entrance  Stations (18 Mar. 19691; Ai,my 
Keg. No .  611-2001, Enlisted Career  Management Fields and Military Occupational 
Specialties (1  Oct. 197:3): Army Reg. KO, 40-501, Standards of Medical Fitness ( 5  
Dec. 1960); Army Reg. No.  601-2008, RecruitingiReenlistment Publicity Program 
(15 hlay 1973). 
1 1 *  23 C . M . A .  142,  48 C . M . R .  758 (1974) (no court-martial  jurisdiction over  
"coerced" volunteer).  The problem of "coerced volunteers" is ageless. The tleci- 
sion in Cntioic  gives no real  indication of t he  Army's long campaign to eliminate 
the  practice of offering an offender the  choice of going to jail ui.joining the  Army. 
S e e  DAJA-AL 197W4356, 19 May 1976. The court tlitl refer to a le t te r  from the  
Army's Judge Advocate General to various chief justices which solicited assist- 
ance in stopping the  practice. The court noted tha t  "implicit in the  le t te r  \ \ e r e  
findings of fact predicated upon empirical experience." If such data existed it \vas 
not presented by the  defense. Nonetheless the court determined tha t  the  regula- 
tion prohibiting such enlistments \vas also for t he  benefit of the  soldier. The ca 
prompted a number of articles and cases. S e e ,  e . q . ,  United Sta tes  v.  Barre t .  
C .M.A.  474,  50 C.31.R. 493 (1975); United Sta tes  v.  Dumas. 23 C.M.R.  278, 
C . M . R .  453 (1973): United Sta tes  v .  Martinez, 52 C.M.R. 59 (A.C.M.R.  1976); 
United Sta tes  v.  Bai dale, ,50 C . M . R .  430 ( S . C . M . R .  1975): United Sta tes  Y, 
Ross, S C M  75 1292 ( N . C . M . R .  270 Mar. 1975) (unpublished); United Sta tes  v.  Day. 
NCbl  7.5 U053 ( K . C . M . R .  9 Sept.  1974) (unpublished); Dilloff. The  I j i ~ ~ o i ! c t / i ' ( ~ r ~ ! /  
Vulicjiteei,:  C o e l r e d  JIiiitcci.y Ei i i is t tr ieuts .  25 A M ,  U. L .  REV.  437 (1976); Ziegler. 
The Impact of 17rtiteri Sitrtes I'. Ctrfiuic. (March 1976) (unpublished paper in The 
Judge Advocate General's School, United Sta tes  Army).  
Recently the Army Court of Military Revien. affirmed a finding of jurisdiction 
uver a "coerced inductee" who had submitted to intluction in re turn  for dismissal 
of tlixft la\$- violation indictments:. The court distinguished Cnfiojc' anti noted that  
the  accused had no right to be free of the draft .  See United Sta tes  v .  Wood, 54 
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RUSSO, lZo although these decisions do not stand alone. lZ1 
Of the three,  Russo presents the greatest  insight into the  poten- 
tial problems presented by enlistments which in some form violate a 
regulation. Russo suffered from dyslexia, a nervous condition which 
severely impairs the  ability to read. Both he and his mother in- 
formed the  recruiter of his disability; the  recruiter then provided 
Russo with a list of numbers and letters to put on the Armed Forces 
Qualifications Test. Russo was enlisted, and later tried and con- 
victed by a court-martial. On appeal, he contended that  he was not 
subject to  court-martial jurisdiction. The Court of Military Appeals 
agreed and set  aside his conviction. 
The court noted that  the controlling regulations a re  for the ulti- 
mate protection of the  individual, and that  the recruit “can best as- 
C.M.R. Adv. Sh. 345 (A.C.M.R. 1976). See also Korte v. United Sta tes ,  260 F.l?tl 
633, 635 (9th Cir.  1958), c e r t .  d e u i e d ,  358 U.S.  928 (1959) (no man has constitu- 
tional r ight to  be free from call to military service). 
119 23 C.M.A. 162, 48 C.M.R. 778 (1974). Brown, age sixteen,  bribed and forged 
his way into t he  Army by presenting himself as a seventeen-year-old who pos- 
sessed the  parental  consent required for enlistment a t  his age.  The facts were  
contested by affidavits on appeal. In reversing the  Army Court  of Military Re- 
view’s decision, which found jurisdiction based upon a constructive enlistment,  
t he  Court  of Military Appeals held tha t  “fairness” prevented the  Government 
from relying on a constructive enlistment as  a basis fo r  court-martial jurisdiction. 
According to  t h e  court ,  t he  Government was estopped because (1) t he  recruiter 
had failed to  witness t he  “forged“ parental  consent form and (2) Brown‘s company 
commander had not acted properly af ter  receiving notice of Brown’s t rue  age.  The 
court noted tha t  ordinarily an  enlistee under t he  age of seventeen may construc- 
tively enlist where he  continues to  serve  af ter  passing the  minimum s ta tu tory  age.  
Before reaching tha t  minimum age,  however, he was “statutorily incompetent t o  
acquire military s ta tus .”  23 C.M.A. a t  164, 48 C.M.R. a t  780. The Army’s Judge 
Advocate General la ter  ruled tha t  Brown‘s service records,  under  t he  regulations, 
could not reflect any bar to enlistment. See DAJA-AL 197513991, 22 May 1975. 
Brown, whose conviction for robbery was nullified, could again enlist in t he  armed 
services, assuming he met o ther  eligibility requirements.  
l Z 0 2 3  C.M.A. 511, 50 C.M.R. 650 (1975). 
lZ1 In the  following cases t he  enlistments were  challenged on the  grounds tha t  t he  
Government failed to follow i t s  regulations: United Sta tes  v.  Muniz, 23 C.M.A. 
530, 50 C.M.R. 669 (1975); United S ta t e s  v .  Bobkoskie, 54 C.M.R.  Adv. Sh. 672 
(N.C.M.R. 1977); United Sta tes  v. Ruggerio, 54 C.M.R. Adv. Sh. 683 (N.C.M.R.  
1977); United Sta tes  v. Robinson, 51 C.M.R. 838 (K.C.M.R.  1976); United S ta t e s  
v. Jones ,  50 C.M.R. 92 (A.C.M.R.  1975); Uni ted  S t a t e s  v .  Huddles tone ,  50 
C.M.R. 99 (A.C.M.R. 1975); United Sta tes  v.  Bunnel, 49 C.M.R. 64 (A.C.M.R. 
1974); United Sta tes  v. Deville, 49 C.M.R. 263 (A.C.M.R. 1974); United Sta tes  v. 
Parker ,  47 C.M.R. 762 (C.G.C.M.R. 1973); United Sta tes  v .  Holloway, 18 C.M.R. 
909 (A.F.B.R.  1955); United S ta t e s  v. Pe r ry ,  1 C.M.R.  516 (K.B.R,  1951); United 
S ta t e s  v. Mott ,  NCM 75 1940 (N.C.M.R.  20 Oct. 1975) (unpublished); United 
S ta t e s  v. Van Allen, NCM 75 1516 (N .C .M.R .  12 Sep t .  1975) (unpublished);  
United Sta tes  v .  Rios, NCM 75 0787 (N.C.M.R.  31 July  1975) (unpublished). See 
also United Sta tes  v .  Burden, 23 C.M.A. 510, 50 C.M.R. 649 (1975) (court cited 
Russo in voiding induction); United Sta tes  v. Ar thur ,  51 C.M.R.  757 (A.C.M.R. 
1975) (court voided inductions because Government failed to follow regulations). 
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sure enforcement” of such protections. lZ2 Because the  regulations in 
question are for the protection of the individual’s personal liberties 
o r  interests,  the court noted that  the Government is bound to abide 
b y  i ts own rules and r e g ~ 1 a t i o n s . l ~ ~  Citing language from Griit l leg,  
the court stated that the Government may not knowingly violate its 
own regulations by entering into “illegal enlistment contracts” and 
then “rely upon the change of s tatus doctrine as  a shield to avoid 
judicial scrutiny. To so conclude would be to countenance on behalf 
of recrui ters  t he  very procedure found objectionable in Gri ) ) i -  
ley .”  lZ4 The court continued: 
The  
Because fradulent enlistments a r e  not in the  public in teres t ,  we be- 
lieve tha t  common law contract principles appropriately dictate tha t  
where recruiter misconduct amounts to a violation of the  fradulent 
enlistment s ta tu te ,  as  was the situation here ,  the  resulting enlistment 
is void as contrary to public policy. Hence the change of s ta tus  al- 
luded to in Grz) ) / / ey  never occurred in this c a ~ e . 1 ~ 5  
court optimistically added that  i ts  holding would have the  
I
“salutary effect of encouraging recruiters to  observe applicable re- 
l z 2  23 C.M.A. a t  512, 50 C.M.R. a t  651. The regulatory provision (Trainability 
Requirements) in question was Rule C ,  Tables 2-1 and 2-2, Army Reg. No .  601- 
210, Personnel Procurement,  Regular Army Enlistment Program (24 Mar. 1969). 
The court in effect disregarded the  G r i w l e y  language which stated tha t  such qual- 
ifications were  for the  benefit of t he  Government. 
l z 3 S e e  23 C.M.A. a t  512, 50 C.M.R. a t  651. The court’s reliance on American 
Fa rm Lines v .  Black Ball Fre ight ,  397 U.S. 532 (1970) was misplaced. In tha t  case 
t he  procedural regulations were  for the  benefit of the  Government ( ICC),  not t he  
complaining individuals. The court stated: “[Il t  is always within the  discretion of a 
court  o r  an administrative agency to relax o r  modify i ts  procedural rules adopted 
for the  orderly transaction of business before it when in a given case the  ends of 
justice require i t .”  397 U.S. at  553. United Sta tes  v .  Shaughnessy. 347 U.S. 260 
(19541, also relied upon to support  this position, can likewise be readily distin- 
guished from Ricsso. In S k n u g h ) i e s s y ,  t he  Court  was concerned with the  legality 
of t he  Attorney General side-stepping existing regulations and depriving an alien 
of his “right” to a fair hearing before the  Board of Immigration Appeals. The 
regulation in question was clearly insti tuted for the  benefit of aliens facing tlepor- 
tation. 
Only by using strained logic can it be argued tha t  the  eligibility criteria in clues- 
tion (Army Reg. No. 601-210) were intended for the p r i t i i a r y  benefit of t he  s e w -  
icemembers. The general rule is tha t  the  regulation in question must be for the  
p r i t u a r y  benefit of t he  complaining par ty .  At bes t ,  the  Court  of Military Appeals 
in Russo  only delineated collateral benefits to  the  enlistee. 
lz4 The “procedure found objectionable in Gri/ ic/ey” must have been Grimley’s ar -  
gument tha t  h i s  fraud served to void his enlistment. S e e  137 U.S. at 150-51. The 
Court  of Military Appeals seems to be laboring under the  false 
sustaining jurisdiction will countenance the  illegal actions of the  recruiter.  If the  
recruiter has violated applicable s ta tu tes  or regulations, administrative and/or 
criminal sanctions should be imposed. 
lz5 23 C.M.A. a t  513, 50 C.M.R. at 652. 
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cruiting regulations while also assisting the armed forces in their 
drive to eliminate fraudulent recruiting practices.” 126 
The Russo rationale was galvanized in Uiiited States v. Little 127 
where the recruiter, after having been told that  the recruit was il- 
literate, allegedly assisted him on his second Armed Forces Qualifi- 
cations Test by explaining the  meaning of some of the  words. This 
technical vio1ation,12* accorcling to the  court, succeeded in destroy- 
ing the  only vehicle available t o  determine literacy, one of the  “es- 
sential prerequisites for enlistment.” 129 
The long range effect of these cases is not clear.130 The Court of 
lZ6 Id. a t  512, 50 C.M.R. a t  651. In adopting what in effect amounts to an “exclu- 
sionary” rule,  the  court adopted an ironic twist  in military law. Because the  bur- 
den res ts  upon the  Government t o  prove jurisdiction over t he  accused, t he  tr ial  
counsel is placed in the  position of establishing the  i7iiioce)zce of t he  recruiter.  If 
he  fails and the  military judge dismisses t he  charges on the  Russo rationale, does 
not tha t  ruling amount t o  a finding tha t  t h e  recruiter’s “misconduct amounts t o  a 
violation of t he  fradulent enlistment s ta tu te?”  See UNIFORM CODE O F  MILITARY 
JUSTICE a r t .  84,  10 U.S.C. 0 884 (1970). If t he  Court  of Military Appeals continues 
to  bind itself to t he  Russo posture,  then it should also adopt t he  rule tha t :  (1) i t  
must be presumed that  t he  accused was  competent t o  enlist; and (2)  in order  to 
rebut  tha t  presumption, t he  accused must show his disqualification a n d  t ha t  re- 
cruiter misconduct, if any, amounted t o  an intentional violation of t he  fraudulent 
enlistment s ta tu te .  For a discussion of t he  Government’s burden of proof in estab- 
lishing jurisdiction see United S ta t e s  v. Spicer,  3 M.J. 689 (N.C.M.R. 1977); 
United S ta t e s  v. Bobkoskie, 54 C.M.R. Adv. Sh. 672 (N.C.M.R. 1977); United 
S ta t e s  v. Brede,  NCM 76 1946 (N.C.M.R. 23 Feb.  1977) (unpublished); United 
S ta t e s  v.  Barefield, NCM 76 0435 (N.C.M.R. 21 June 1976) (unpublished). 
l Z 7  24 C.M.A. 328. 52 C.M.R. 39 (1976). 
l Z 8  In Russo ,  the  court  predicated avoidance of t he  enlistment on “violation of t he  
fraudulent enlistment s ta tu te .”  However,  in Lit t le t he  court voided the  enlist- 
ment not on an  intentional violation of t he  s ta tu te  but ra ther  on what could be  
characterized a s  a good faith effort on the  pa r t  of t he  recruiter.  The court ,  there- 
fore,  has not made a distinction between active misconduct and good faith “techni- 
cal violations.” In United Sta tes  v. Holmes, CM 433150 (A.C.M.R. 6 May 1976) 
(unpublished), the  accused had enlisted in spite of mental and physical bars t o  
enlistment. The court held t ha t  enlistment was void; while the  accused’s allegation 
fell short  of an affirmative showing of “misconduct,” it did establish tha t  t he  re- 
cruiter was a t  least “negligent” in failing to  investigate t he  accused’s qualifica- 
tions. Accord,  United Sta tes  v.  Johnson, NCM 76 0332 (N.C.M.R. 12 August 
1976) (unpublished). But see United S ta t e s  v. Ewing, CM 43314 (A.C.M.R. 27 
May 1977 (unpublished) and United S ta t e s  v. Harrison, NCM 77 0239 (N.C.M.R. 
18 Aug. 1977) (unpublished) (negligence does not void enlistment). 
lZ9 What is an “essential prerequisite for  enlistment?” The court seems danger- 
ously close to  legislating prerequisites for military service. Establishing criteria 
for  enlistment is a function of either Congress or  the  executive department.  I t  is 
not a function of judicial bodies, federal or  military. See, e .g . ,  United Sta tes  v. 
Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 316 (1947). 
130 At least  one wri ter  feels tha t  these recent military cases have rung the  death  
knell of the  constructive enlistment concept. See Grayson, Rece)if Developments 
i ) i  Couyf-Mnytinl Jurisdicfiori: The Demise of Constructive E)il istment,  72 MIL. 
L. REV. 117 (1976). However,  several  recent opinions have revitalized the  con- 
cept.  See, e . g . ,  United Sta tes  v. Wagner,  CM 433607 (A.C.M.R. 20 Jul.  1977), 
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Military Appeals stated in Rz~sso that  it was applying common law 
contract principles, but an examination of the common law applica- 
tions and a review of the court’s prior positions on the subject incli- 
cate that  the court was really applying a “change of status’‘ 
The primary question, in the court’s view, was: “Did the enlistment 
comport with all controlling s tatutes  and regulations?” 
These cases obviously deal with the  limited question of court- 
martial jurisdiction, but t he  rationale has been adopted by The 
Judge Advocate General in dealing administratively with question- 
able e n l i ~ t m e n t s . ’ ~ ~  If it is determined by either the military courts 
or  The Judge Advocate General that  an enlistment is invalid, 133 col- 
lateral questions such as  a servicemember’s right to accrued pay 
and veterans’ benefits arise. 134 Army regulations now facilitate 
~ M . J .  __ (A.C.M.R.  1977); C‘nited Sta tes  v.  De La Puente ,  CM 434626 
(A.C.M.R.  20 June  1977) (memorandum opinion). S e e  a l s o  Morrow, Informal 
En t ry  Into t he  Military Service (1966) (unpublished thesis in The Judge Advocate 
General‘s School, U.S. Army).  
1 3 1  In Riisso,  Cnt lom,  and Broicii the  Court  of Military Appeals applied an estop- 
pel theory which prevented the  Government from arguing constructive enlist- 
ment.  S e e ,  United Sta tes  v.  Marshall, 3 M.J .  612 (N.C.M.R.  1977). Under  com- 
mon law contract principles, the  Goverri m i i t  is ?tot estopped by the  unauthorized 
acts of one of i ts  officials. See United Sta tes  v. Rossi, 342 F.2d 505 (9th Cir. 1965) 
and the  cases cited therein.  
1 3 *  The decision in Riisso required a shift in position for The Judge Advocate Gen- 
eral  on the  subject of irregular enlistments. See DAJA-AL 197515179, 4 Nov. 
1975. The earl ier  position had declared tha t  an enlistment entered with frauds 
being committed by both the  enlistee and the  recruiter was voidable, not void. See  
DAJA-AL 197514137, 9 July  1975. For a discussion of irregular enlistments pre- 
ceding Russo, see Gotldard, Constructive and Fraudulent Enlistment (1962) (un- 
published thesis in The Judge Advocate General’s School, U.S.  Army).  
L33 A great  deal of confusion in this area  would be eliminated by declaring the  
enlistment contract in question to be either voidable or valid. Corbin points out 
tha t  one who says  tha t  an “agreement or promise is ‘void’ usually supposes tha t  i t  
has no legal operation whatever;  being in many cases quite unaware tha t  a number 
of important legal relations have been created.” 1 A. CORBIK, CONTRACTS 15 
(1963). The legal relation formed here would be the  servicemember’s “s ta tus .”  
Sta tus  is not solely dependent upon a valid enlistment contract .  That concept has 
been recognized by the  Court  of Military Appeals, see United Sta tes  v. King, 28 
C.M.R.  243 (1959) (dictum), and the  military in general since 1896. See  DIG. OPS. 
JAG 1912 EnlistrrieTits para. 1A-3c, a t  603-04 (1896); accord ,  United Sta tes  v .  
Reaves,  126 F. 127, 133 (5th Cir. 1903) (enlistment in the  Army may be annulled 
and vacated  bu t  i t s  effects remain) ;  Uni ted  S t a t e s  v .  Luce ,  2 C .M.R .  734 
(A.F.B.R.  1951) (court cites numerous authorities for proposition tha t  fraudulent 
enlistment has both civil and criminal effects; enlistment may be void for civil 
purposes but not criminal purposes). To simply declare enlistments “void“ often 
ignores years of valuable and good faith service of a soldier. If an enlistment is 
considered voidable, the  servicemember can a t  least argue ratification. 
134 Relying on opinions of the  Comptroller General, the  Army’s Judge Advocate 
General has ruled tha t  once it is determined tha t  an individual is serving under a 
void enlistment,  he is not entitled to  any fur ther  pay. See DAJA-AL 197614202, 30 
Mar. 1976. See also DAJA-AL 197513991, 24 Jan .  1975: 55 Comp. Gen. 1421 (1976); 
.. - . 
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summary separation of a servicemember who claims to have fraudu- 
lently enlisted with recruiter connivance. 135 If in fact the  enlistment 
is determined to  be void, the individual is released without a dis- 
charge and the appropriate personnel forms a re  completecl t o  show 
“no service.” 136 
D .  
Although the military courts and The Judge Advocate General 
consider the  enlistment to be primarily a question of status when 
reviewing the basis of court-martial jurisdiction, The Judge Advo- 
cate General does consider the enlistment to  have the “attributes of 
the contract” when determining whether there has been a breach of 
the  enlistment agreement.I3? Misconduct by the soldier can be com- 
pared to a breach of contract because the  soldier has i,mpliedly 
BREACH OF THE ENLISTAdENT CONTRACT 
54 Comp. Gen. 291 (1974); 47 Comp. Gen. 671 (1968); 39 Comp. Gen. 360 (1960); 39 
Comp. Gen. 742 (1960). 
135 See  DAPC-EPA-A3022282 Mar. 76, SUBJ:  Interim Change to  AR 635-200 and 
635-206. S e e  a l s o  DAPE-MPR 3013002 Nov. 76, SUBJ:  Processing Fraudulent 
Enlistments Involving Improper Aid by Recruiting Officials (so-called Recruiter 
Connivance); DAPE-MPE-PS 0113592 Dec. 76, SUBJ:  Clarification of Recruiter 
Connivance P rocedures  in Chap te r  1-1, 635-200. Pu r suan t  to  t hese  message  
changes, a commander must void the  enlistment if after  reasonable inquiry it ap- 
pears tha t  recruiter connivance was involved. Recruiter connivance does not void 
the  enlistment unless (1) the  eligibility requirement in question actually amounted 
to a disqualification and (2) the  disqualifying fea ture  actually existed at  t he  t ime 
of enlistment. If the  enlistment is  void, a commander exercising general  court- 
martial jurisdiction may authorize immediate enlistment of an individual who: 
(1) Requests such enlistment;  and 
(2) Ei ther  has no prior service, or if prior service, was eligible a t  t he  t ime of 
( 3 )  Whose disqualification is waivable (except adult felony conviction); antl 
(4) Has service prior t o  voidance which is  of a character tha t  clearly supports 
The individual‘s personnel records are  changed to  reflect tha t  any period of voided 
service is not creditable for promotion or longevity. 
136 DAJA-AL 197515186, 29 Oct. 1975, Inequities do  exist in such a process. The 
soldier who has served honorably forfeits arguably gained benefits and the  mili- 
t a ry  is subjected to possible enlistment of military offenders a t  a later time. The 
appropriate personnel form, DD 214 (Report  of Separation From Active Duty) is 
comple t ed  in accordance  wi th  A r m y  R e g .  635-5, P e r s o n n e l  S e p a r a t i o n s -  
Separation Documents (20 Aug. 1973). The information on this form may serve as 
a basis for determining what benefits, if any, t he  individual will receive. 
Some of the  inequities may be softened by The Judge Advocate General’s opin- 
ion, DAJA-AL 1976ifi028, 30 Dec. 1976. Where the  servicemember has acquiesced 
in good faith to  recruiter connivance, he should be separated,  when necessary,  
under AR 635-200, para .  5-31, which gives recognition for previous service. For 
purposes of court-martial jurisdiction. however, no such distinction is  made. Ac- 
cording to Ritsso,  t he  enlistment is void. DAJA-AL 197515186, 4 Dec. 1975. 
13i DAJA-AL 197515398, 2 Dee. 1975 (where servicemember agreed to serve in 
Korea for 12-month tour ,  no material breach occurred when Congress changed 
tour to  13 months). Sre aIso DAJA-AL 197514380, 16 July  1975 (distinguishing 
technical antl material breaches). 
last separation for enlistment without waiver; and 
enlistment. 
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agreed to  serve in accordance with service regulations. If he fails to 
d o  so, the Government in its discretion may discharge him or may 
instead choose to discipline him and retain him for future service. 138 
What if the Government acts in a manner inconsistent with the 
te rms  of the enlistment agreement? Most problems in this area arise 
in cases in which the servicemember enlists under one of the many 
options which may include either special training or choice of as- 
signments. When he does not receive what he bargained for,  he 
seeks relief. The Judge Advocate General has noted that in the ab- 
sence of a supervening statute ,  emergency, or  waiver, an enlist- 
ment is normally governed by general principles of contract law. 13y  
The Government is required to fulfill those commitments included in 
the enlistment contract.140 
But according to The Judge Advocate General, not all departui-es 
from the terms of the contract a re  "material breaches" which give 
rise to a remedy. 141 If, foY example, the servicemember 1-eceives an 
occupational specialty other than that promised, a material breach 
has not occurred if the servicemember's misconduct precluded the 
"option." 14* If, however, the  servicemember is blameless, a mate- 
rial breach serves as  the basis for i*elief.143 Until recently, tenipor- 
ary deployment (thirty days or less) of servicemeinbe~s who were 
promised specific units or geographical locations did not amount to a 
material biseach. 144 Now, changes to  enlistment option agreements 
138 The Government must retain flexibility in retaining or discharging s o l d i e i ~ ; .  
One reason for retaining a fraudulent o r  erroneous enlistee is purely economic i n  
nature.  Historically, the  military has recognized the cost of training. housing. antl 
feeding recruits .  Recovering those expenditures from fraudulent enlistees \rho 
a re  discharged is impractical and the  costs may be offset by retaining those enlis- 
tees  and requiring them t o  fulfill the i r  enlistment contracts. Although courts heai- 
t a t e  to specifically enforce personal service contracts,  the  military enlistment con- 
tract  seems to be the  exception. See  Dilloff, A C o u t r r ~ c t i t n i  A u n i y s i s  u f f l i e  J J i i i -  
fa! ' ! /  E)i/i.sft)te)it, 8 U .  RICH. L .  REV. 121, 147 (1974). 
1 3 9  DAJA-AL 197515174, Ci N o v .  1975. See C J ~ S O  DAJA-XL 197515398, 2 Dec. 193;: 
notes GG-G9 and accompanying text  s / c p i ~ ~ .  
I 4 O  DAJA-AL 197615074. 6 Aug. 1976, See a i s o  DAJA-AL 197914112, 1Y June  1973 
( D D  Form 4, enlistment contract ,  is of paramount significance in  determining na- 
ture  and duration of individual's military statue).  
1 4 1  See DAJA-AL 19'7514380, 1 G  July 1975, where a distinction is made between 
technical antl material breaches-a distinction recognized by the federal courts.  
See,  e . g , ,  Crane v.  Coleman, 389 F. Supp. 22 ( E . D .  Pa .  1975): Bemia v .  Whalen, 
341 F .  Supp. 1289 (S .D.  Cal. 1972): see  notes 70-75 antl accompanying text s i c p ~ , n .  
1 4 *  DAJA-AL 197614881, 26 July 1976 (servicemember's misconduct made it i n -  
possible for him to serve in promised area;  transfer by A r m y  no  breach).  Pee rtisv 
DAJA-AL 197214779, 28 Aug. 1972. 
The soldier may be separated under the provisions of A R  635-200, pa1.a. 5-32 
(DAPC-PAS-IC 0714002 Feb.  75). See C J ~ S O  DAJA-AL 197515354, 15 Dec. 19'73 
(servicemember received substantially different Military Occupational Specialty). 
144 DXJA-AI, 197614881. 26 July 1976. 
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provide that  servicemembers who enlist for special units or  assign- 
ments may be deployed with those units.145 Once undertaken, ac- 
tions to discharge the  servicemember for misconduct or because the  
Government has breached its “commitment” must be in compliance 
with due process protections either expressed or implied in the per- 
tinent regulations. 146 
If the  servicemember feels that he has not received all that  was 
promised him, he may not use the government‘s shortcomings as  a 
defense to  any misconduct or  self-help a ~ t i 0 n s . l ~ ~  His remedy lies in 
either seeking a discharge within military channels or  testing the 
validity of his enlistment by means of a habeas corpus proceed- 
ing. 14* If the  servicemember’s position is sound, regulations require 
that  corrective action be taken.149 
E .  SUMriVARY 
The difference in the military and federal perspectives might be 
explained by simply recognizing that  each body focuses on different 
facets of the  enlistment. The contemporary federal courts focus on 
contractual (civil) aspects such as promised assignments, schooling, 
and pay. Contemporary military courts focus on the resulting mili- 
tary  s ta tus  for the purpose of determining court-martial jurisdiction 
(criminal aspects). Such an explanation is only superficial. The dis- 
t inctions between t h e  t w o  perspect ives  r u n  deeper ;  t h e y  a r e  
grounded on divergent views of the very nature of the soldier-state 
relationship. The federal courts view the relationship largely as a 
145 DAJA-AL 197713797, 30 Mar. 1977. The pertinent “Statement of Enlistment” 
(DA Form 3286-18) now provides in part:  
e .  In t h e  e v e n t  t h e  unit  or  ac t iv i ty  t o  which I am assigned or  a t t ached  unde r  t h e  provisions of 
t h i s  option,  or t h e  subord ina t e  e l emen t  of t h e  unit  t o  which I am assigned or  a t t ached  is d e -  
ployed,  inac t iva ted ,  d i sbanded ,  discont inued,  reorganized o r  r edes igna ted  p r io r  t o  t h e  e s p i r a -  
tion of t h e  gua ran t eed  minimum period of  a s s ignmen t ,  I will remain assigned t o  t h e  ac t iv i ty ,  
un i t ,  or  subord ina t e  e l emen t  of t h a t  uni t  o r  he r eass igned ,  in accordance wi th  t h e  needs  of the  
A r m y .  
f .  I may he sub jec t  t o  per iods of t empora ry  du ty  a s s ignmen t  on an  individual basis  away from 
t h e  ac t iv i ty ,  uni t  o r  subord ina t e  e l emen t  of t h e  unit  fo r  which en l i s t ing .  Such periods of t e m -  
po ra ry  d u t y  will not  count  aga ins t  t h e  gua ran t eed  per iod of s tabi l izat ion indicated in I b ,  above.  
146See note 129 supra .  
147 S e e ,  e.g., United Sta tes  v. Bell, 48 C.M.R. 572 (A.F.C.M.R. 1974). Bell unsuc- 
cessfully argued a t  his court-martial tha t  he had gone AWOL only af ter  the  Air 
Force’s repeated failure to  rectify what he considered false promises made by the  
recruiter.  
14* Service in the  armed forces is  considered sufficient deprivation of liberty to 
consti tute “custody” for purposes of habeas corpus. See  Jones v. Cunningham, 371 
U.S. 236 (1962); Hammond v. Lenfest ,  398 F.2d 705 (2d Cir.  1968). 
149 AR 635-200, para.  5-32 (DAPC-PAS-071400Z Feb.  7 5 )  details the  procedures 
for actions on unfulfilled or erroneous enlistment commitments. 
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creature of contract where the relationship has been voluntai-ily as- 
sumed. The military courts tend to t reat  it as a creature of s tatutes  
and regulations. 
Although it seems unlikely that  the  military courts will in the 
near future shift gears and recognize the contractual aspects of the 
enlistment, as long as the Government relies upon contractual prom- 
ises to induce enligtment, disposition of both civil and criminal as- 
pects should reflect that  reliance. 
The position of the present Court of Military Appeals on the ques- 
tion of enlistments is largely a reflection of its over all interest in 
protecting the  rights of the individual servicemember. 150 The Gov- 
ernment, therefore, must bear the heavy burden of satisfyiiig all 
s t a t u t o r y  and r egu la to ry  r equ i r emen t s  when en l i s t ing  s e r v -  
icemembers. Failure to do so will probably not be fatal to the civil 
aspects of the enlistment (e.g., enforcement of enlistment options) 
because general principles of contract law tend to  be flexible. But ,  
failure to adhere to statutory or regulatory provisions will, for the 
present,  be fatal to the criminal, or jurisdictional, aspects. Is such a 
distinction necessary? The following sections examine the possibility 
of treating both criminal and civil enlistment problems in a uniform 
manner. 
VI. THE ENLISTMENT: A UNIFORM APPROACH 
Comparison of the  early forms of the soldier-state relationship 
with today's form reveals significant differences. And despite the  
large amount of litigation, no satisfactory statutory definition of the 
relationship exists. 1 5 1  Time and again the  courts have struggled 
with the issue and in doing so have often only clouded the issue. 111 
efforts to explain the relationship, courts have compared it to citi- 
zenship, 152 marriage, 153 and the employer-employee relationship. lS4  
1 5 0  S e e  Cooke ,  T h e  C'tc i ted  Stcrtes Coio . t  of Milifnr.!/ A p p e o I s ,  1 9 7 . 5 - 1 9 7 7 :  
J u d i c i a l i z i i i g  the Mi l i t n t ' g  J u s t i c e  Sustettc. 76 MIL. L .  REV.  43 (1977). 
151 10 U.S.C.  5 501 (1970) simply s ta tes :  "In this chapter 'enlistment' means origi- 
nal enlistment or reenlistment." Army Reg. 601-210, Regular Army Enlistment 
Program, para.  1-4e (C3, 1 Dec. 1975), is equally vague: 
e .  E i i l i ~ t m ~ n t  A voluntary  enrol lment  in t h e  R e g u l a r  A r m y  as  a n  enl is ted  m e m b e i .  . in  et)- 
l i s tment  i s  consummated by aubacription t o  t h e  prescr ibed oath  of e n l i s t m e n t .  T h e  t e r m  " en- 
l i s tment ."  as  used in th ib  regula t ion ,  inc ludes  e n l i s t m e n t  o f  both  nonpr ior  service  a n d  p r i o r  
I e r v i c e  perPonnel.  u i t h  t h e  l a t t e r  c a t e g o r y  also inc luding pr ior  A r m y  personnel and pevsonnel 
wi th  pr ior  service  in  a n y  of t h e  o t h e r  A r m e d  F o r c e s .  
lS2 United Sta tes  v .  Grimley, 137 U.S. 147 (1890). 
I S 3  I d  
I s 4  Parker  v. Levy, 417 L.S. 733, 751 (1974). The Supreme Court noted tha t  t he  
relationship of the  Government to  members of the  military is "not only that  of 
lawgiver t o  citizen, but  also tha t  of employer to employee." The Court added tha t  
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A. THE SOLDIER-STATE RELATIONSHIP: 
WHAT IS  IT? 
In U?iited S fa tes  v. Staiidard Oil f 2 0 . l ~ ~  the court discussed the  
soldier-state relationship in the context of a suit brought by the 
Government to recover costs expended in treating a soldier negli- 
gently injured by the defendant. The court recognized the unique 
nature of the  relationship but hesitated to label i t  as a master- 
servant  o r  employer-employee relationship. Ins tead,  the  court  
viewed the Government obligations toward a soldier as  “more legis- 
lative than contractual”: 156 
When a man becomes a soldier, a s ta tus  is created whether the  sol- 
dier enlists voluntarily or is selected under  a Selective Service law. A 
voluntary enlistment originates in a contract for a definite period. 
But there  any similarity between i t  and o ther  contractual relation- 
ships, such as  master  and servant ,  ceases. The essence of the  relation 
of master  and servant is t he  freedom of the  servant to end i t ,  subject ,  
of course, to responsibility for wrongful termination. But even a vol- 
unteer  cannot withdraw from the army during the  period of enlist- 
ment.  Wrongful ending or even long, unexcused absence, is punish- 
able as  a crime both in peace and in war  time.15’ 
The court continued in its effort to label the relationship by noting: 
For ,  a f ter  making due allowance for the  differences, we still have a 
cohesive pact which, like t he  pactum subjectionis- the pact between 
king and subject  in mediaeval Europe- ties the soldier to  the  Gov- 
ernment,  a t  the  same time reserving to  each rights and obligations 
which flow from their  union. Or we might apply to it the  word which 
French jur is t s  have coined to characterize certain solidarities which 
lie a t  the  basis of social action--iiistifufioii. Such iiisfitiLtioi/ gives 
rise to droit  institutionnel, a body of r ights arising from the  commun- 
ality of the  group, such as t he  family, in which each member exercises 
cer ta in  r i gh t s  and has obligations not a s  an  individual, bu t  a s  a 
member of t he  iirsfifufioit, according to t he  position he occupies- 
suam cuique dignitatem. These rights o r  obligations s tem,  not from 
the  members as  individuals (in t he  case of the  family, parents  or chil- 
dren) ,  but from the  basic fact which brought i t  into being (in t he  case 
of the  family, marriage).158 
the  Government is often “employer, landlord, provisioner, and lawgiver rolled 
into one.” I d .  
60 F .  Supp. 807 (S.D. Cal. 1943), rev‘d on  o f h e r  gvozciids, 153 F.2d 958 (9th 
Cir. 1946), affd, 332 U.S. 301 (1947) (judicial establishment of new grounds for 
liability would intrude into congressional area of control). 
156 60 F. Supp. a t  810. 
157 I d .  
158 I d .  a t  811. The soldier-state relationship has also been characterized as being 
tha t  of an employer-employee. Parker  v. Levy. 417 U.S. 733 ,  761 (1974). 
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Adding to  the confusion is the fact that  there is disagreement 
among legal writers over the advisability of labeling legal relation- 
ships as contractual, or quasi-contractual. lsy And there a re  those 
who view society as a movement of relationships from status to con- 
t rac t ,  160 while others specifically reject tha t  position. 1 6 1  Recent 
domestic judicial posture seems to favor the consideration of most 
legal relationships as contractual or a t  least quasi-contractual.  
Where does the legal relationship we know as the “enlistment” fit 
and how should it be treated? These questions are met with mixed 
and conflicting responses. Some resolution of the conflicts may lie in 
a uniform or standard approach to the problem.162 
B.  A ULVIFORM APPROACH 
The lack of consistency on the subject of enlistments should be 
apparent from the preceding sections. But,  is the law of enlistments 
subject to consistency? Consider first t h e  views of one writer on the 
matter: 
The courts a r e  constantly oscillating between a desire for certainty 
on the  one hand antl a desire for flexibility antl conformity to present 
social standards upon the other.  I t  is impossible tha t  in a progressive 
society the  law should be absolutely certain.  I t  is equally impossible 
tha t  the  courts should render  decisions conforming to the prevailing 
notions of equity without thereby causing a considerable degree of 
uncertainty,  owing to the constant fluctuations in moral standards 
and their  application to ne\v and unforeseen conditions. 163 
The illusive nature of “absolute certainty” should not act as a tle- 
terrent  in any search for uniformity. The preceding sections confirm 
that  a great deal of uniformity has been subordinated to “flexibil- 
i ty.” The conflicting perspectives seem to stem from diverse appli- 
cations of broad, well-settled principles of law. Unnecessary diver- 
sity arises when those broad principles are abandoned or when they 
are distinguished out of existence by attention to the individual 
facts of each case. One ivriter has stated: 
Is9 60 F. Supp. a t  81%. 
I 6 O  H. MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 170 (1st ed .  1861). 
1 6 1  S e e  Hume v. Moore-McCormack Lines, 121 F.2d 336, 343 nn. 19-22 (2rl Cir. 
1941). 
1 6 *  See 3 R .  P O U N D ,  JURISPRUDENCE 732-36 (1969). Pound’s view is tha t  our  judi- 
cial system is approaching a condition where codification is likely t o  be resorted 
to. His position is based to some extent on five defects of form which exist in 
Anglo-American law: want of certainty;  waste of labor entailed by the  unwieldly 
form of t he  law; lack of knowledge on the  par t  of those who amend i t ;  irrationality, 
due to partial survival of obsolete precepts;  and confusion. The same “defects” 
may be used as  a basis for applying a standard approach to the law of enlistments. 
163 J. W u .  JURISPRUDENCE 291 (1958). 
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Law, as  St. Thomas Aquinas has pointed out ,  belongs to “practical 
reason,” and deals with contingent mat ters ,  tha t  is, with variables. 
This is why, however certain the  basic principles of law may be ,  t he  
more we descend to  the  details the  less degree  of certainty we  find. In 
order to secure a practical certainty,  which is necessary for social 
order  and peace, there  must be established some intermediary rules 
between universal  principles and concrete cases. Such rules must 
needs deal with the  average,  and proceed in gross and on the  whole. 
In order to  reduce the  infinite complexities of human affairs to  some 
kind of o r d e r ,  t h e  law m u s t  c lass i fy  t h e m  i n t o  c e r t a i n  b r o a d  
categories, and affix to  each category some rules and measures more 
o r  less appropriate to  i t .  Fo r  if there  were  as  many rules or measures 
as  there  a r e  things measured or ruled,  they would cease to be of use,  
since their  use consists in being applicable to many things.  16* 
One method of dealing with broad principles or general rules is to  
establish a common or  uniform approach which employs those gen- 
eral rules. The term “uniform approach’’ is used to describe a stand- 
ard application of criteria for measuring the validity and effect of 
any enlistment contract. In other words, the uniform approach is an 
attempt to establish a definite methodology for solving enlistment 
problems. 
Any common approach would require consideration of the three 
factors which have contributed to  the needless diversity: 
a.  The lack of a common definition of the  term “enlist- 
ment.” The term is used interchangeably to  refer to 
the act of becoming a soldier as  well as  to  the com- 
pleted act or  status.  
b. Diverse opinions as  to what rules o r  bodies of law gov- 
ern  the soldier-state relationship known as  the “en- 
lis tment,  ” 
e .  The role of public policy in determining the validity of 
the “enlistment.” 
1. Recoguitio?i of n C o ~ n ~ r 1 0 ~ 2  Defi?iitioiz: Coxtract,  S ta tus ,  or Both? 
The te rm “enlistment” will continue t o  be a well-recognized 
method of describing the  voluntary soldier-state relationship. How- 
ever,  its meaning is unclear and problems arise when the term “en- 
listment,” through judicial or administrative actions, takes on di- 
verse meanings. For  example, it should not be used to  describe the  
soldier-state relationship established by induction. 
Some of the definitional inconsistencies can be attr ibuted to the  
1641d. a t  289. 
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philosophy that  a legal relationship is either a contract or a status, 
bu t  never  encompasses both cniic.cpts. However,  t he  Supreme 
Court in G r i w l e y  did not hesitate t o  use both terms in defining the 
enlistment. 165 Although the  Court explained how the terms could 
both be utilized, later decisions have attempted to further clarify 
the effect of the now famous G7airuley definition: 
Enlistment in the  military service of t he  United Sta tes  is a volun- 
t a r y  act establishing a contractual relationship. . . . 
Respondent asser ts  tha t  enlistment differs from normal contractual 
relationships in t ha t  t he  enlistee thereby changes his s t a tu s  from 
civilian to soldier. While this may indeed be the  case, . . . this has n o  
relevant effect on the  basic rights of t he  parties here  involved. The 
fact t ha t  t he  enlistee has changed his s ta tus  means tha t  he  cannot 
through breach of t he  contract throw off this s ta tus .  Rut  chxnge of 
s ta tus  does not invalidate t he  contractual obligation of e i ther  par ty  o r  
prevent the  contract from being upheld, under  proper c i r cums tanc~~~s ,  
by a court  of law.1fifi 
The change of s tatus from citizen to soldiey can be either volun- 
tary or involuntary. When the change is effected by an agreement, 
contract, or compact with the Government, the effectuation of a new 
s t a t u s  is  presumed t o  have  been voluntary .  In addit ion,  t h e  
emergence of the neiv s tatus cements the  c o n t i x t  because of the 
extraordinary characteristics of the soldier-statti relationship. But 
the  voluntary relation is still contractual in nature. 
An examination of t he  enlistment agreenient i l  self confiims 
this.167 The parties may agree to  length of servict,, assignments, 
t raining,  compensation, da t e  of e n t r y ,  and p r o n i ~ t i o n s .  These  
agreements may be indicated either 011 the enlistment agreement 
itself or in attached annexes. Physically, the  entii-e enlistment 
165 137 U.S. 147, 150-51 (1890). One wri ter  has noted that  although the  concept.; 
tatua a re  "protean and elusive," a t  t he  time of t he  G ) , i / / / / p , q  tleci- 
'mutually exclusive." See Casella, .A/.o,ed F o i ~ c e s  E i i i i . ~ f ~ i ~ c / i f :  T i / ( ,
1.Tse a j ~ d  A b u s e  of' Co i i f vac t .  39 U. CHI. L .  R E V .  788.  785 11.14 (1972). 
1 6 6  Pfile v. Corcoran. 287 F.  Supp.  554, 556-37 iD. Colo. 19tiX). 
16'  Depar tment  of Defense F o r m  4 ( 1  J u n e  
"Agreements,"  "Benefits" and "Understanding 
of these  sections is couched in contractual terms 
type of terms tha t  a r e  used: 
7 5 )  contains sect ions  enti t let l  
Although the  language in each 
em l r j  piwvitle:: a glimpse of t he  
lli. I hereby cer t i fy  t h a t  I h n t ' e  , , rod  thir a g r e e m e n t  c( i t  ha.  hcrii full! r \ j i l a i i l r i l  tu 
me.  and I unr le r>tani l  i t  and  t h e  c o i i d i t i o i i s  u n d e r  15 h i rii;ihtiiiy I utidvv-tami :hctt 
OSLT t h u s e  prunii.-ea concerninp ass ignment  t u  d u t y ,  prographica!  dreri ,  t r a i m n y .  o!' ii p.,t - 
t iculiir  rchoul o r  specia l  program: Government  quar te l ' s .  ph! i i c a l  ani1 o t h e r  qualific 
ass ignment  t o  a p a r t i c u l a r  school ,  r a t i n g .  o r  ~ p e c i a l t y :  butiure;. "1' rItht.1, conipzn>atiil  
t ions :  01' t r i inzporra t ion  of aiid suppor t  t o  dependents  cot)tdiiietl her r i t i  or rec,urtled 1 1  
i i e x ( e s )  a t t a c h e d  h e r e t o .  if a n y .  wi l l  be honured  ani1 t h a t  an! othri, pr 
t h e r e i n  m a d e  b! an! per-uii  iir? n o t  r ffrct i re  and u i l l  nl i t  h e  h 
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agreement often approximates a personal service contract. The 
nature of the  agreement has prompted a t  least one federal judge to 
say that  not only is it a contract, but principles of equity require 
that  some degree of mutuality is'required even in a military enlist- 
ment ~ 0 n t r a c t . l ~ ~  
It is the requirement of mutuality, or  ra ther  the lack of i t ,  which 
renders the  enlistment contract unique. However, the enlistment 
agreement does not appear so one-sided with the  advent of enlist- 
ment options, increased pay and benefits, and the  federal courts' 
posture of reviewing military status by habeas corpus. 170 If a defect 
arises in the execution of the agreement of service, the agreement 
may still become binding by virtue of the parties' conduct. An im- 
plied contract may result.'" In either case, the civilian acquires the 
s ta tus  of a soldier. 
The soldier's "status" may be compared with the common law po- 
sition of public officers. They were considered to  possess what has 
been characterized as  iicompulsory" status.  Once they accepted the  
responsibilities of their  offices, they were subject t o  mandamus 
until their  resignations were  accepted. The rationale for such a 
binding status was based on the  view that  the public should not suf- 
fer  from the lack of public That reasoning and the  
16' F o r  contrast ,  consider t he  form of an early enlistment contract found in E x  
par t e  Brown, 4 F. Cas. 325 (C.C.D.C. 1839) (No.  1,972). 
I ,  William Brown.  do acknowledge t h a t  I h a v e  voluntar i ly  enl i s ted  myself t o  s e r v e  f o u r  y e a r s  
i n  t h e  m a r i n e  c o r p s  of t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s ,  unless  sooner  d i s c h a r g e d ,  upon t h e  t e r m s  ment ioned 
in  t h e  a c t  passed t h e  11th  d a y  of J u l y ,  I798 [ I  S t a t .  5941, ent i t led  " An a c t  f o r  e s t a b l i s h i n g  and 
organiz ing a m a r i n e  corps" ; a n d  also t h e  a c t  passed t h e  2d day of March,  1833 [ 4  S t a t .  6471. 
e n t i t l e d  "An a c t  t o  improve t h e  condition of t h e  non-commissioned officers and p r i v a t e s  of t h e  
arm]  a n d  m a r i n e  corps  of t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s ,  a n d  to  p r e v e n t  deser t ion" ;  and t h a t  I h a v e  had 
r e a d  t o  m e  t h e  r u l e s  and a r t i c l e s  of t h e  a r m y  and n a v y  a g a i n s t  m u t i n y  a n d  deser t ion .  
W i t n e s s  m y  hand t h i s  7 t h  d a y  of J a n u a r y ,  1835. 
h is  
"William X Brown."  
m a r k  
I d .  
169 Larionoff v. United Sta tes ,  365 F. Supp. 140 (D.D.C. 19751, a f f d .  533 F.2d 
1167 (D.C. Cir. 1976), a f f d ,  97 S. Ct.  2151 (1977). S e e  a l s o  Shelton v.  Brunson, 
335 F. Supp. 186 (N.D. Tex. 19711, nffd in pa,? ,  vaca ted  i)t p a r t ,  454 F.2d 737 
(5th Cir. 1973) (Wisdom, J . ,  dissenting) (if contract principles a r e  t o  be applied, 
principles applicable t o  contracts of adhesion should be used).  
"Osee  Peck, The Jus t ices  a,td the G e i t e m i s :  The  S u p r e w e  Court  a ~ d  Ji tdzcinl  
R e v i e w  of M i l i t a r y  Activities, 70 MIL. L .  REV.  1 (1975). 
1 7 1  For  a good discussion by the  Court  of Military Appeals on constructive enlist- 
ments (implied contracts)  see United Sta tes  v. King, 11 C.M.A. 19, 28 C.M.R. 243 
(1959). See also U.S. DEP'T O F  ARMY, PAMPHLET No. 27-21, MILITARY ADMINIS- 
17* See Edwards  v.  United Sta tes ,  103 U.S. 471, 473-74 (1850). Fo r  fur ther  dis- 
cussion of " status,"  see 4 R .  POUND, JURISPRUDENCE 262-76 (1959). 
TRATIVE LAW HANDBOOK 3-45 (1973); note 51  SZLp)'a. 
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Griniley rationale, which forbade the  soldier from casting off his 
military status, seem to be of the same fabric. 
The terms “contract” and “status” not being inconsistent for defi- 
nitional purposes, the following definition would serve well: 
Enlistment:  The act of voluntarily agreeing to serve  in an armed 
force as  a servicemember for a fixed period of time. The agreement is 
usually effected by executing an enlistment contract. Execution of 
tha t  document (1) places contractual obligations on both the  Govern- 
ment and the  volunteer, and (2) changes the  volunteer’s legal s ta tus  
from civilian to  servicemember. Absent a valid formal enlistment con- 
t rac t ,  the  parties may nonetheless by their  actions accomplish the  
same end. 
Any  common defini t ion should include considerat ion of both 
elements-contract and status. To ignore the importance of “status” 
relegates the  enlistment agreement to a mere contract. To ignore 
the contractual element encourages a rigid and formulaic approach 
to the problem and elevates form over substance. 
2 .  
T h e  proposed common definition recognizes t h e  voluntary  
soldier-state relationship as  being primarily contractual in na- 
t ~ r e . l ’ ~  Principles of contract law should be consulted first in de- 
termining (1) the validity of the enlistment contract a t  i ts inception 
and (2) the  rights of the  parties under the enlistment contract. For  
example, contract law should be applied if the issue concerns the 
jurisdiction of a court-martial or if a purely administrative determi- 
nation is required. 
Rather than applying the law of contracts of the  place of esecu- 
tion of the  enlistment contract, the approach should instead be fed- 
eral in character-looking to sources such as federal case law or the 
Restateitieiit 0.f Coii tracfs .  Pertinent s tatutes  and regulations 
App1icatio)i of Geiternl Prixciples of Coiitract Law 
L73 See,  e.g.. Op. Att’y Gen. 187, 190 (1853) (enlistments a r e  contracts which ought 
t o  be construed according to general  principles of contract law. Brct see Cnited 
Sta tes  v .  Standard Oil Co.,  60 F. Supp. 807, 810 (S.D. Cal. 1945), where the  court 
noted tha t  t he  soldier-state relationship was primarily “legislative.” One wri ter  
has proposed tha t  t he  relationship should be viewed as governed partly by s ta t -  
u te ,  part ly by military regulation and partly by contract. Casella. s i i p ~  note 165, 
a t  807. 
174 Colden v .  Asmus, 322 F. Supp. 1163, 1164 (S.D. Cal. 1971) (court will look to 
general principles of contract law, including law of federal contracts as inter- 
preted in federal court decisions). See also  United Sta tes  v .  Standard Oil Co.,  832 
U.S. 301, 305 (1947), where the Supreme Court stated: 
P e r h a p s  no re la t ion  b e t w e e n  t h e  Government  and a citizen is more  itistinctivel>- federa l  in 
c h a r a c t e r  t h a n  t h a t  b e t w e e n  it  and m e m b e r s  of its a r m e d  forces. To w h a t e v e r  e x t e n t  s t a t e  lau  
ma!: apply t o  g o v e r n  t h e  re la t ions  b e t u e e n  soldier,- or o t h e r s  in t h e  a rmed  forces  ani1 p e r r o n s  
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should be considered as  indications of congressional and executive 
intent to declare persons eligible to  enter  into the enlistment con- 
tract.  As such, they must be considered to be for the  benefit of the 
Government unless specifically stated otherwise. Likewise, enlist- 
ment regulations should be considered procedural or  directory in 
nature and should not invalidate an otherwise valid enlistment if not 
strictly followed. Unless specifically s ta ted otherwise,  they too 
should be presumed to be for the benefit only of the  G 0 ~ e r n m e n t . l ~ ~  
A great deal of inconsistency and inequity would be precluded by 
restricting the  concept of “void” enlistments. 176 The concept con- 
notes the  complete absence of any legal relations when in fact a 
servicemember  may have obtained “s ta tus”  a s  a soldier not -  
withstanding defects in the  enlistment contract. 177 I t  would be 
much simpler to label enlistment contracts either “voidable” or 
“valid.” That would more closely comport with prevailing principles 
of contract law. 17* Questions of the validity of enlistment contracts 
entered into by minors and insane persons present special problems. 
They may be dealt with in a number of ways. Firs t ,  they may con- 
tinue to be considered void, with no legal force and effect for either 
civil or criminal aspects. Alternatively, they could be viewed as  
voidable a t  the option of the Government for civil and/or criminal 
purposes.179 
outside t h e m  o r  nonfederal  gove rnmen ta l  agencies .  t h e  scope,  n a t u r e ,  legal incidents  and con- 
s equences  of t h e  relat ion be tween  pe r sons  in se rv ice  and t h e  Government  a r e  fundamental ly  
de r ived  f rom federa l  sou rces  and gove rned  by federa l  a u t h o r i t y .  
175 The fallacy in declaring eligibility regulations to be for the  benefit of t he  re -  
cruit lies in t he  fact tha t  with a mixture of imagination and a l i t t le logic, any 
requirement could be construed to  be for the  benefit of the  recruit .  To avoid the  
problem, perhaps the  Government should drastically simplify the  regulatory re-  
quirements so tha t  any “able-bodied citizen” may enlist. In all probability, t ha t  
requi rement  would also be  construed to be for t he  benefit of t h e  “cit izen.” 
Another alternative would be to  specify requirements for enlistment with express 
declarations as  to which provisions were for t he  benefit of t he  Government. See 
Section VI1 i n f m .  
Enlistments should be  labeled as  “void” only where t he  governing s ta tu te  o r  
regulation expressly declares them t o  be “void.” See ETS-Hokin & Galvan, Inc. v. 
Maas Transport ,  Inc . ,  380 F.2d 238, 260 (8th Cir.) ,  cer t .  de i i i ed ,  389 U.S. 977 
(1967). The statutory requirements for enlistment have been viewed time and 
again as  being directory in na ture  and current Army Regulations provide tha t  the  
Secretary of t he  Army may approve a fraudulent enlistment otherwise invalid be- 
cause of a “non-naivable” disqualification. See DAPC-PAS-S 2614002 Jun  7 5 ,  
SUBJ:  Change to  A R  636-200, para.  14-12(f). 
177  1 A .  CORBIN, CONTRACTS 12-17 (1963). See nlso  note 133 s q ~ r a .  
178 I d .  
179See ,  e.g., Paulson v. McMillan, 8 Wash. 2d 295, 299-300, 111 P.2d 983, 985 
(1941). See also note 212 and accompanying text  i ~ i , f m .  
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Historically, these two categories have received special t reatment  
because they both raise questions concerning “competence” to enter  
into contractual relations.lSo If an individual is of age and of sound 
mind, then failure to meet qualifications (such as citizenship or ab- 
sence of felony convictions) should render the contract voidable. lS1 
The same should hold t rue  for similar regulatory qualifications. To 
consider all statutory and regulatory qualifications as  measures of 
“competence” only dilutes and confuses the issue. Characterizing 
such contracts as “voidable” would allow the  Government the neces- 
sary ability to release unqualified soldiers and permit personnel to 
avoid some of the inequities which result from summarily declaring 
periods of prior service to be void. Although the enlistment agree- 
ment may be defective, the resulting service is often honorable and 
rendered in good faith. 
3 .  Bcclcctice of Zirtetvsts 
Implicit in almost all enlistment cases is a balancing of the inter- 
ests  of the  parties involved. I t  is this balancing which provides the 
needed flexibility in determining the validity of the  enlistment con- 
tract and the subsequent obligations and rights of the parties to that  
agreement.182 In any case the  interests to be considered are:  
(a) The servicemember’s interest.  
(b) The Government’s interests. 
(c) The public’s interests.  
We turn first to  the interests of the servicemember, the indi- 
vidual who has volunteered his service to the Government. The 
servicemember’s interests a r e  personal in nature. Although he may 
have enlisted because of a sense of patriotic duty,  he is still in- 
terested in receiving promised benefits which translate into finan- 
cial security. Fo r  instance, the servicemembey does live a somewhat 
restricted lifestyle. The environment subjects him to higher re- 
quirements of discipline, and he is subject to punishment for actions 
considered by his civilian counterparts as harmless. lS3 When an in- 
l s r r S r e .  e . g . ,  United Sta tes  v .  Robson, 24 C . M . R .  375 ( A . R . R .  19.571, where a 
twenty-year old alien was presumed ”competent“ to enlist. 
l S 1  S e e  note 186 s icprn.  
ls2 Implementing a standard t rea tment  for a problem does not necessarily lead to  
an inflexible t rea tment .  In this instance it cannot, because the  proposed balance of 
interests tes t  includes consideration of the  public‘s interest-public policy. Such 
consideration provides some flexibility. 
l s 3  Despite continued reforms in military justice,  many writers cling to  obsolete 
visions of soldiers serving in involuntary servitude without any constitutional 
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dividual agrees to serve as  a soldier he may exercise one of several 
enlistment options. la4 H e  can expect t ha t  t he  Government will 
stand behind its promises of special training or assignments. 185 He 
can expect that  his constitutional rights will not be disregarded and 
he  will d i scover  t h a t  numerous  jud ic ia l  a n d  admin i s t r a t i ve  
safeguards have been incorporated into the system for his bene- 
fit.186 In  return for his honorable service he can also expect prom- 
ised remuneration in the form of pay, promotion, and benefits.la7 
The government’s interests,  on the other hand, lie chiefly in fulfil- 
ling’its mission of maintaining an armed force fully capable of meet- 
ing national needs as  they arise. An element of meeting this mission 
is the requirement for discipline. Because i t  is t he  Government 
which plays the role of employer in the  soldier-state relationship, 
the Government determines whom it will employ. In  the same man- 
ner,  it is the  Government which decides if the soldier-state relation- 
ship will be continued or dissolved. The government’s interests a re  
paramount but not always absolute. They stand with the enlistment 
contract itself in the  shadow of the Constitution.lss 
When the validity of the  enlistment contract is questioned, the 
delicate balance of the  two competing interests is often tipped when 
a third interest,  the public’s interest,  is considered. lag The public’s 
interest is usually expressed in terms of public policy: “a very un- 
ruly horse . . . once you get astride i t  you never know where i t  will 
carry you.” lgo 
safeguards. See Casella, supra note 165, a t  799. See also  Raderman v. Kaine, 411 
F.2d 1102 (2d Cir.  1969); Smith v. Reasor, 406 F . 2 d  141 (2d Cir. 1969); Krill v. 
Bauer,  314 F.  Supp. 965 (E.D. Wis. 1970). The recent decision in Pa rke r  v. Levy, 
417 U.S. 733 (1974), however, shows an awareness by the  Supreme Court  of t he  
“fairness” of the  military judicial system. That decision recognizes the uniqueness 
of t he  military system. Thus ,  we see another  argument for distinguishing military 
enlistment contracts from purely private employment contracts. 
I a 4  The ability of the  recruit  to take advantage of t he  options may be dependent on 
meeting qualifications, especially where  t he  option requires specialized training. 
Army Reg. No.  601-210 contains the  thirteen primary enlistment options. 
185 S e e ,  e.g., Johnson v.  Chafee, 469 F.2d 1216 (9th Cir. 1972); Bemis v.  Whalen, 
341 F. Supp. 1289 (S.D. Cal. 1972); DAJA-AL 197615074, 6 Aug. 1976; DAJA-AL 
197514380, 16 July  1975. 
lS6See,  e.g., United Sta tes  v. Burton,  21 C.M.A. 112, 44 C.M.R. 166 (1971) (90- 
day speedy tr ial  rule). 
S e e  Bell v.  United Sta tes ,  366 U.S.  393 (1961) (statutory right to accrued pay). 
The Government must accord due process to the  servicemember if he is t o  be 
discharged from the  service. See Allgood v. Kenan, 470 F . 2 ~ 1 .  1071 (9th Cir. 1972); 
Silverthorne v. Laird, 460 F.2d 1175 (5th Cir. 1972). 
The third interest  may not always be the  “public” in teres t  a s  such. The inter- 
e s t  of a parent of a minor enlistee might t ip  the  balance. It certainly did so in 
earl ier  cases where t he  right of the  parent to  the  custody of a minor enlistee was 
considered paramount absent pending court-martial charges. 
lS0 J.  Wu,  JURISPRUDENCE 143 (1968). 
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Public policy is considered to be an implementation of the  common 
good. When applied to  the area of contracts the following is apropos: 
The law looks with favor upon the  making of contracts between 
competent parties upon valid consideration and for lawful purposes. 
Public policy has i ts  place in the  law of contracts,- yet tha t  wil1-o'- 
the-wisp of the  law varies and changes with the  in teres ts ,  habits. 
needs, sentiments and fashions of the  day, and courts are  adverse to 
holding contracts unenforceable on the  ground of public policy unless 
their  illegality is clear and certain. 
This  ra ises  a question for  t he  s tuden t  of Jur isprudence  a s  t o  
whether tha t  which the  law looks upon with favor is not the  result of a 
s t ronger  policy of laiv. In fact, Sir George Jeesel ,  M . R . ,  explicitly 
appealed to public policy in support of the  freedom of contract: "If 
t he re  is one thing which more than another public policy requires it is 
tha t  men of full age and competent understanding shall have the  u t -  
most liberty of contracting, and tha t  their  contracts when entered 
into freely and voluntarily shall be held sacred and shall be enforced 
by courts of justice: Therefore,  you have this paramount public policy 
to consider in tha t  you are  not lightly to interfere with this freedom of 
contract ."  I g 1  
In  addition to the  careful consideration of the servicemember's 
and government's interests,  the public has an interest in the "in- 
stitution" of the soldier-state r e l a t i ~ n s h i p . ' ~ ~  Thus we see the com- 
parison of the enlistment to marriage and citizenship. These rela- 
tionships have traditionally been eonsidered special because it is in 
the public's best interest that  they be maintained and not easily dis- 
solved. The public's best interest requires that  once bound by a con- 
tract with the Government, the servicemember may not a t  his plea- 
sure reject the agreement which binds him. Consider the position of 
a court faced with the question of the validity of a minority enlist- 
ment: 
I t  is not reasonable that  a minor, of age to enlist, who secures the  
honorable and responsible position of a soldier in the United Sta tes  
army,  could abandon his c o l o ~ s  in the  face of the enemy and on the  eve 
of batt le,  and avoid tr ial  and punishment for desertion by the  inter- 
vention of his parents ,  who had not consented to his enlistment,  but 
who had taken no s tep  to aroid it before the soldier's a r res t  for deser -  
tion; or that  he could endanger the army by betraying i ts  secrets t o  
the enemy, and not be atnenable to military jurisdiction. his parents  
objecting. We cannot approve a view that  leads to such results.1Y3 
The balance of interests provides flexibility to the uniform ap- 
I d .  at 144. 
United Sta tes  v.  Standard Oil Co . .  60 F. Supp. a t  811 
lY3 I ? / ve Miller, 114 F. 838 (5th Cir.  1902). 
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proach. Flexibility can lead to foot-loose application of both the def- 
inition of enlistment and the  applicable law. And it can lead to  in- 
consistency. Nonetheless, the  risk is reasonable. The interes ts  
should be balanced. The Supreme Court in United States v. Grirriley 
considered i t  to be against public policy to  allow a deserter to avoid 
his responsibilities by deceiving the Government and then pleading 
his disability as  a bar to  court-martial jurisdiction. Public policy re- 
quired paramount consideration of the  government’s interests. 
Regarding the  role of public policy in determining the validity of 
enlistments, Winthrop wrote: 
That  the  United S ta t e s  should be held to  be precluded from ratifying 
an irregular enlistment where the  disqualification did not impair, or 
had ceased to  impair, the  value of the soldier, who meanwhile had 
performed service, received pay, etc.; or where the soldier had com- 
mitted a military offense and his trial by court-martial and punish- 
ment were  called for by the  interests of discipline-would be an  un- 
f o r t u n a t e  c o x f i n g e n c y  aud agaiwst p u b l i c  po l icy .  l S 4  
The Court of Military Appeals, however, ignored the  foregoing 
considerations and held it to be against public policy to  sustain 
court-martial jurisdiction over a servicemember who had fradu- 
lently enlisted with the  aid of a recruiter. lg5 Public policy, according 
t o  t h e  c o u r t ,  r equ i red  pa ramount  considerat ion of t h e  s e r v -  
icemember’s interests notwithstanding his criminal conduct. Both 
the  Supreme Court and the  Court of Military Appeals applied what 
they perceived to  be the  “public policy.” Both rode the “unruly 
horse.“ Ig6 
C. APPLICATION OF THE 
UNIFORM APPROACH: 
GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS 
The uniform approach is not a simplistic application of rules of 
contract law to enlistments. I t  fully recognizes the  importance of 
the change of “status” and the  competing interests involved. The 
utility of the approach is seen in its application. Uniform or  stand- 
ls4 W. WINTHROP, supra  note 94, a t  545-46 (emphasis added). Arguably, Winth- 
rop was noting two separa te  grounds for Government ratification of an irregular 
enlistment. The one is constructive enlistment. The o ther  is  commission of an of- 
fense. 
l g 5  United Sta tes  v. Russo, 23 C.M.A. 511, 50 C.M.R. 650 (1975). See  notes 120- 
126 and accompanying text  supra .  
l S 6 S e e  note 190 supra .  
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arc1 tests  do not guarantee uniform results, but an accepted uniform 
approach will promise a degree of predictability and will cut through 
the  needlessly diverse treatment of enlistment problems. Consider 
the  following in the application of the uniform approach. 
1 .  
The initial inquirx should be: Have the parties to the enlistment 
contract satisfied the elements required for the formation of a valid 
antl binding agreement? The prerequisites for the formation of a 
simple contract a re  (1) mutual assent,  ( 2 )  consideration, (3) two or  
more parties having a t  least limited capacity, antl (4) the agreement 
must not be one declared void by s tatute  or by rule of common 
If these requirements are met,  the enlistment contract is 
valid antl binding for all purposes. If any of the requirements is not 
satisfied, the agreement may still be found binding on the equitable 
theory of implied contract-the constructive enlistment. lg8 Despite 
some commentators' position that  the constructive enlistment is no 
longer viable,199 the  concept is well-founded antl should remain a 
useful method of curing defects in the enlistment contract. 
Because t he  enlistment contract is a contract which changes 
s tatus,  even serious defects should not invalidate the agreement. 
Unless a s tatute  clearly restricts the capacity of a citizen to enter  
into an armed forces enlistment contract, defects resulting from the 
implementing regulations should only render the  enlistment con- 
tract voidable. The interests of the public favor preservation of the 
agreement .2f' ' '  
Likewise, misfeasance or malfeasance on the part of the recruiter 
should not automatically void the  enlistment contract.  The  re -  
cruiter, under prevailing rules of contract and agency law, is an 
agent for the  principal, the  United States  Government.*O1 The un- 
authorized acts of the agent a re  outside his actual authority and are 
not binding upon the Government. However, the lat ter  should be 
able to ratify the agreement if i t  so chooses. I t  may decide to  do so 
in a case where the servicemember is singularly distinguished in his 
For))icrfio)/  qf' f h e  Eitl isfrue)it  Coiitinct 
lY7 L.  SIMPSON, CONTRACTS 5 8 (ztl  ed. 1%%). 
lY8 S e e notes 130 & 171 s i c p v a .  
l g y  S e e  note 130 s u p ~ n .  
*"" The argument for preserving the agreement in time of ~ ' a r  is especially strong 
and the  argument remains persuasive during peacetime. The military is required 
to maintain a ready armed force. Unless courts are  capable of predicting periods 
of peace or war ,  enlistnients should be treated as  if the arnietl force is engaged in 
wartime activities. 
*01 See Shelton v .  Brunson, 465 F.2d 144 (5th Cir.  1972). 
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service, and it should certainly be able to  ratify the agreement 
w h e r e  s e r ious  cha rges  have  been  p r e f e r r e d  aga ins t  a s e r v -  
icemember.202 In  that  case, even equity should not intervene in the 
criminal proceeding.203 Once again, the  interests of the public and 
the Government outweigh the interests of the servicemember who 
is pending trial. 204 
Public policy requires that if the servicemember has committed an 
offense, he should be tried, notwithstanding a defective enlistment. 
If a recruiter acted improperly in recruiting him, he too should be 
subject to  disciplinary action. 205 To void the enlistment contract 
would, as Winthrop noted, violate public policy.2o6 
2 .  
The enlistment contract may delineate specific responsibilities of 
the parties.207 Specific remedies usually a r e  not indicated. For  the 
most part ,  both the responsibilities and the remedies a re  found in 
the numerous regulations which now govern almost every aspect of 
military life. If either party fails to  fulfill its responsibilities, the  
injured party may at tempt to  avoid the agreement on a breach of 
contract theory. 208 As discussed in preceding sections, both the  fed- 
Perforiii cl i i ce  of the E ) i  list iiieirt Coil t ? n c t  
202 See note 221 ant1 accompanying t e s t  i ~ f ) . c c .  
2n3 "The maxim that  equity will not enjoin a criminal prosecution summarizes cen- 
turies of weighty experiences in Anglo-American law." Stefanelli v. Minartl, 342 
U.S. 117, 120 (1951). 
*04 See note 194 antl accompanying text  s u p m .  Historically, civil courts have 
granted no relief to accused servicemembers serving under illegal contracts of 
enlistment as  long as  they are  undergoing military trial or discipline. See  Z)/ )'e 
Rober t ,  2 Hall Law 192 (Pa .  1809); Grace v. Wilber, 12 Johns (N.Y. )  68, where t he  
court s ta ted:  
T h e  contrac t  lof e n l i s t m e n t ]  m a y  be v o i d  and he m a y  be ent i t led  t o  h is  d i s c h a r g e ;  but  i t  does 
not fo l iu i j  t h a t  he  is t u  be  h is  own j u d g e .  and t o  d ischarge  himself by  d e s e r t i o n .  A n y  p e r s o n  
u t h o r i t y  o r  mi l i ta ry  force may obta in  his d i s c h a r g e ,  if h e  i s  e n t i t l e d  t o  i t ,  
by application t o  t h e  p r o p e r  civil a u t h u r i t i e s .  b u t  P rolrlie? in ac tual  r e l v i c e  cannot  be  a l l o u e i l  
to  d e > e r t  a t  p l e a r u r e .  
Cited in United Sta tes  v. Julian,  43 C.M.R. 876, 878 (N.C.M.R. 1971). See notes 
4.5 & 113-116 antl accompanying t e s t  .supi.n. 
* 0 5  The recruiter may be punished administratively or under the provisions of the  
UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE ar ts .  84 & 92, 10 U.S.C. 884 & 892 (1970). 
2i'6 See W. WINTHROP, s u p i n  note 94, a t  545-46. 
*07 See Dep't of Defense Form 4 (1 June  1975). 
' " * 6 ) u f  see Benwax v. Barnhill, 300 F. Supp. 483 (D .R . I .  1969) where the  Gov- 
ernment unsuccessfully argued tha t  a conscientious objector could not be (lis- 
charged because he had a binding and enforceable contract with the  Government. 
See crlso McCullough v. Seamans, 348 F. Supp. 511 (E.D. Cal. 1972) where t he  
Government failed in i ts  a t tempt ,  on cross-claims, to collect costs for educating 
Air Force Academy graduates who la ter  were discharged as  conscientious objec- 
tors.  The Government had relied on common law contract principles of recision 
and unjust enrichment. Under  principles of contract law, t he  equitable remedy of 
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era1 courts and the Army's Judge Advocate General are  disposed to 
set aside contracts where a "material breach'' has 0 c c u r r e ~ 1 . ~ ~ ~  
Voiding the enlistment contract for any lesser defect would emas- 
culate the importance of the element of "change of status." The lan- 
guage from U t i i f e d  Sfcrtes 1'. Griw/e . y  that  no breach may destroy 
the s tatus created by the enlistment contract does not deter  the 
orderly recission of an enlistment conti-act. The unique nature of the 
enlistment, the change of status, should be preserved and should be 
considered carefully before an enlistment contract is declared null 
antl 
I t  is in the area of performance of the enlistment contract that 
delineation between the concepts of status and contract must be 
clear. The "enlistment contract" gives rise to the "status." The pal*- 
ties' conduct during the "status" is controlled to some extent by the  
te rms  of the enlistment contract. Fo r  example, the parties may 
agree t o  the length of the s tatus antl may also agree on the so-called 
enlistment options. But,  the nature of the soldier-state relationship 
demands that s tatutes ,  regulations, o r  special circumstances may 
also control the "status" antl may override terms of the enlistment 
contract. 21 Pencling court-martial charges may require extension of 
recision is available if plaintiff is willing to make resti tution.  Matzell $7. Plat t ,  382 
F. Supp. 1010 ( E . D .  Va. 1971). 
209See notes 137 & 141 s i c p t ~ ~ .  I t  has been suggested that  the  law of contracts 
should be applied only Lvhere the sen4cemember is alleging a hreach of contract as 
to  his enlistment option($). S e e  Casella. aicpiv note l(i3. 
2 1 0  One writer.  in analyzing the  contractual aspects of the enlistment,  ha?: ll(Jted 
tha t :  
T h e  use uf culltract l a \v  u i l l  alsu f u s t h e r  clue pruce.-- anr l  penrl'al fairlie.) hy pivinp iiotice t o  
t h e  vo lun tee r  of ir l l  1 1 1 ~ s n i h 1 c  c e r i < ' r t  > ,  I n  order f o r  t h e  enliktment t u  he lep i t imatr l )  
termed a " ~ ~ i i t r a c t . "  the*e pres t e h  must  he  met,  anti t h e  unfr l r tunat r  charac ter iza t ion  ( i f  
enl i>tnient  a i  heinp a change in s t a t u >  will he hanibhed forcvei. I I I  t h r  cdtacumb.; of 5uvestipri 
supremacy .  
Dilloff, A Cor/ f t ,ncf iccr/  .A ic f l / i / s is  of t h c  .\fl.3ilitcr?,(/ h ' u / i s f m ? ? r f ,  8 u. R I C H .  I,. R E V .  
121, 149 (1974) .  
The "chanee of status" conceut should not be banished. I t  is idealistic to con-  
Y 
ceive that  an enlistment contract will advise the  volunteer of all possible con- 
tingencies. General clauses will suffice. To disregard the concept of t he  change of 
s ta tus  ignores the  unique nature of t he  soldier-state relationship. That uniqueness 
was recently recognized and approved by the Supreme Court  in Parker  v .  Levy, 
417 U.S. 733 (1974). For now, the  military represents a distinct society governetl 
by i ts  own rules and regulations. To pass from the  civilian sphere into the  military 
is certainly a change of status.  
2 1 1  S e e ,  Rehart  v .  Clark,  448 F.2d 170, 173 (9th Cir.  1971) (existing s ta tu tes  antl 
regulations a r e  read into t he  enlistment contract): crccoxl. Schulz v .  Reasor,  332 
F.-Supp. 708, 711 ( E . D .  U'is. 1971): Goldstein v. Clifford, 290 F. Supp. 275, 2778 
( D . N . J .  1968). 
When the  servicemember enlists, he s ta tes  that  he untlerstantls tha t :  
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the status, even though the enlistment contract provides for a fixed 
term of service.212 Modification of the terms of military service, 
however, does not make the  enlistment contract any less a contract. 
D. SPECIFIC ENLISTMENT PROBLE,VS 
In  the preceding subsections, the three-step uniform approach 
and general considerations in its application were examined. Here,  
the inquiry will center on application of the uniform approach to 
severa l  specific, f requently encountered enl is tment  problems. 
Graphically, the application of the  uniform approach can be pre- 
(1) I n  t i m e  of w a r  o r  na t ional  e m e r g e n c y ,  or w h e n  o t h e r w i s e  author ized  b y  l a w ,  I shall be  
r e q u i r e d  t o  s e r v e  as o r d e r e d  by c o m p e t e n t  author i t ies .  n o t u i t h s t a n d i n g  t h e  provis ions  of 
a n y  Annex(es)  a t t a c h e d  h e r e t o  o r  a n y  o t h e r  p r o m i s e s  m a d e  t o  m e  in connect ion  wi th  my 
e n l i s t m e n t  ( r e e n l i s t m e n t ) .  
(2)  S t a t u t e s  a n d  regula t ions  appl icable  t o  personnel  in  t h e  A r m e d  F o r c e s  of t h e  Uni ted  S t a t e s  
m a y  c h a n g e  w i t h o u t  notice t o  m e  and t h a t  such c h a n g e s  m a y  af fec t  my s t a t u  
t ion ,  o r  obl iga t ions  as  a m e m b e r  of t h e  A r m e d  F o r c e s ,  t h e  provis ions  of t h  
a g r e e m e n t  t o  t h e  c o n t r a r y  notwi ths tanding:  and 
(3) A n  e n l i s t m e n t  in t h e  R e g u l a r  A r m y .  R e g u l a r  S a v y ,  R e g u l a r  Air  F o r c e ,  R e g u l a r  Mar ine  
C o r p s ,  or R e g u l a r  C o a s t  Guard  in ef fec t  a t  t h e  beginning of a u a r  o r  e n t e r e d  i n t o  d u r i n g  a 
w a r  c o n t i n u e s  in ef fec t ,  unless  s o o n e r  t e r m i n a t e d  by t h e  P r e s i d e n t .  unt i l  s i x  m o n t h s  a f t e r  
t h e  t e r m i n a t i o n  of t h a t  w a r .  
See DD Form 4 ,  Enlistment Agreement,  Pa r t  IV.  
212 The mere expiration of a servicemember’s te rm of service does not automati- 
cally terminate his military status.  See Messina v. Commanding Officer, 342 F. 
Supp. 1330 (S.D. Cal. 1972); Taylor v. Reasor,  19 C.M.A. 405, 42 C.M.R. 7 (1970); 
United S ta t e s  v. Hout,  19 C.M.A. 299, 41 C.M.R. 299 (1970). Such extensions of 
mi l i ta ry  s t a t u s  a r e  controlled by MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL,  U NITED 
STATES, 1969 (Rev. ed.) ,  para.  l l d  and AR 635-200, para.  2-40 (Interim change, 4 
Apr .  77) which now provides: 
A m e m b e r  may b e  r e t a i n e d  beyond t h e  expi ra t ion  of h i s  t e r m  of service  when an  inves t iga t ion  
of h is  conduct  h a s  b e e n  in i t ia ted  wi th  a view t o  t r i a l  b y  cour t -mar t ia l :  c h a r g e s  ha\,e been pre-  
f e r r e d ;  o r  t h e  m e m b e r  h a s  b e e n  a p p r e h e n d e d ,  a r r e s t e d ,  confined or o t h e r w i s e  r e s t r a i n e d  by 
t h e  a p p r o p r i a t e  mi l i ta ry  a u t h o r i t y .  H o w e v e r ,  if c h a r g e s  have  not been p r e f e r r e d .  t h e  m e m b e r  
shall not  be  r e t a i n e d  m o r e  t h a n  30 d a y s  beyond t h e  e x p i r a t i o n  of h is  t e r m  of service  wi thout  t h e  
personal  a p p r o v a l  of t h e  g e n e r a l  cour t-mar t ia l  convening a u t h o r i t y  concerned.  
Failure of t he  Government to comply with similar controls resulted in the  reversal  
of a court-martial conviction in United Sta tes  v. Walck, 54 C.M.R. Adv. Sh.  308 
(A.C.M.R. 1975) (The predecessor to the  above provision required approving ac- 
tion by the  convening authority,  or his designee, even though other actions to 
bring the  accused to  tr ial  had commenced). The Secre tary  of t he  Army sub- 
sequently changed the  provision into i t s  present form. See C i i j i l t 7 i / O l  L ~ M  Sectio), ,  
THE ARMY LAWYER, Feb.  1977, a t  19. The earl ier  provision was also the  subject 
of judicial r ev i ek  in United Sta tes  v. Torres ,  3 M . J .  669 (A.C.M.R. 28 Apr .  1977) 
(en banc), where the  court overruled Wnlck insofar as it held (1) that  failure of t he  
Government to  comply with i ts  own regulations divests t he  court of jurisdiction to  
t r y  the  accused, and (2)  tha t  t he  sole remedy is dismissal of the  charges.  The 
majority opinion noted tha t  the  convening authority had in effect complied with 
t he  requirement to  give necessary approval for retention where he referred the  
accused’s case to  trial. The court noted: 
W e  f u r t h e r  find no reason t o  penalize t h e  G o v e r n m e n t  in t h i s  case  t o  i n s u r e  compliance wi th  
t h e  regula t ion  in t h e  f u t u r e .  Noncompl iance  is not in and of itself a violation of a basic cons t i tu-  
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sented in a decision flow chart.  213 Three situations in which the 
questionable validity and effect of enlistments commonly wise are:  
a. During his court-martial, the accused servicemember 
alleges that  his enlistment contract is invalid and he is 
therefore not subject t o  the court-martial's juristlic- 
tion. 
b. A sei*viceniember, not under pending charges, seeks 
an administrative discharge on the grounds that his en- 
listment contract was entered illegally. 
e. A servicemember argues that nrhen he enlisted, he \vas 
specifically promised training in a specialty w e a ,  and 
an accelerated promotion upon completion of t ha t  
training. He states that he has received neither antl 
argues breach of his enlistment contract. 
The first two situations fall ivithin the area of formation of con- 
timiiil r ight  - u  a. t u  
l i i i  t t i i r l  uirrtr (.( 
3 1 I . J .  at Iifi3 (emphasis atltletl). 
In  his dissenting opinion, Judge Cook stated tha t  p e m ~ i t t i n p  the Goveimnient to 
go to trial In spite of the fact tha t  it had violated its o\vn regulation nullifies the 
rule tha t  t he  Government is bound by i ts  o \ ~ n  regulations. I n  his vien., t he  Gov- 
ernment was estopped to contend that  the  accuse(\ i.emainetl subject tu  wui ' t -  
martial jurisdiction. 
The  reasons and requirements for exercising criminal jurisdiction over those 
persons awaiting a discharge were set  forth in a concurring opinion by Judge Cos- 
tello. 
1. To maintain integrity of the  military force as  by inhibiting soldiers fiwm 
walking off an active battlefield on the  day their  enlistments nominally es- 
pire. 
2 .  To provide order antl regularity during the delay incident t o  the  mu; - t e r -out 
of troops af ter  the need for massive mobilization has passed. 
3. To prevent fortuitous cleansing of t he  slate by the  routine discharge of those 
who deserve both to  be called to account antl to  be barred from reenlistment.  
4.  To foster disciplined conduct by individuals in the final f e u  d a y s  or hours of 
service. 
5. To provide a legal s ta tus  a n d  b for payment antl management of such 
persons. 
See g e ) i e m i l g  AR 635-200, ch. 2 ,  for examples of extensions (voluntary and  in- 
voluntary) of t e rms  of enlistment agreements.  Sue n i s o  United Sta tes  v.  Do\r.ns, 3 
C.M.A. 90, 11 C . M . R .  90 (1953) where the  period of military s ta tus  was extended 
while t he  soldier received hospital t rea tment .  Likewise. it is possible to  effect a 
"constructive discharge" when both parties by their  actions, or inactions, make it 
clear tha t  they acquiesce in a "discharge status."  LT!riited Sta tes  v.  Santiago. 1 
C.M.R. 365 (A.B.R.  1951) (accuserl's confinement by the  Army after a discharge 
did not constitute service which would effectuate a constructive enlistment).  SCV 
DAJA-AL 1976i5049, 3 Aug. 1976. 
213 See  Appendix A. 
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tracts.  The third would be considered a contract performance ques- 
tion. 
First,  as  to the court-martial jurisdiction problem: Is there a valid 
contract under governing rules of contract law? This s tep  requires 
close consideration of the  contract as  a whole and the  conduct of the 
partjes in executing the agreement. If the answer is “yes,” valid de 
jure  s tatus follows and the court-martial has jurisdiction. If the an- 
swer is “no,” the inquiry continues. 
Although there is not a valid formal contract, is there an implied 
contract under principles of contract law which gives rise to a con- 
structive enlistment? If not, there is no jurisdiction absent an alter- 
nate basis for If there is a constructive enlistment, 
the balancing test  is employed to determine if there are any reasons 
which preclude jur isdict ion.  F o r  example,  unde r  t h e  c u r r e n t  
rationale used by the Court of Military Appeals, equity prevents the 
Government from relying on a constructive enlistment where a re- 
cruiter‘s malfeasance has resulted in an invalid enlistment con- 
If the  balance, however, swings in favor of the  Govern- 
ment,  jurisdiction would be present.  216 
In the second case, the  issue is once again the validity of the en- 
listment contract a t  i ts formation. The question arises, however, in 
an administrative setting and again the initial inquiry is whether a 
valid, formal contract was entered into in accordance with general 
principles of contract law. If so, the servicemember is not entitled 
to  a discharge on the grounds of an invalid enlistment contract. If 
there is not a valid formal enlistment agreement and no constructive 
enlistment has arisen, a balance of interests test  is employed to de- 
t e r m i n e  if t h e r e  i s  a n y  j u s t  r ea son  f o r  r e t a i n i n g  t h e  s e r v -  
icemember. 217 
214 A proposed s t a tu to ry  change would provide an a l ternate  basis for  court-  
martial jurisdiction. S e e  Section VII. ijifm. Even absent a s ta tu te ,  the  rationale 
for basing jurisdiction on “de facto” s ta tus  may be sufficient. See  United Sta tes  v.  
Julian,  45 C.M.R. 876 (N.C.M.R.  1971); notes 114-116 and accompanying t ex t  
s icpra.  If t he  individual is not amenable to  court-martial as a servicemember, he 
may still be subject to court-martial under provisions which provide court-martial 
jurisdiction over civilians. See  UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE a r t s .  2(10) & 
18, 10 U.S.C. $ 5  802(10) & 818 (1970). 
215 United Sta tes  v. Russo, 23 C.M.A. 511, 50 C.M.R.  650 (1975). S e e  notes 120- 
126 and accompanying text  supra. 
216 See  note 194 and accompanying text  s i c p ) ~ .  
2 1 7  A variation of this problem might be simply stated as follows: An individual 
under the  minimum s ta tu tory  age enlists antl honorably completes a two-year tour  
before reaching tha t  minimum age. He later reenlists and upon completing a total  
of twenty years’ service seeks a discharge antl ret irement benefits. He learns tha t  
t he  original tu-o-year enlistment is  considered “void“ and tha t  he owes the  Gov- 
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Analysis of the  third case, involving a breach of the enlistment 
contract, follows the method used in the first two situations. The 
initial inquiry is whether there is a valid formal contract, o r  a sub- 
stitute therefore, under general principles of contract law. If so, has 
a “material breach“ occurred? If the answer is “no,“  there is no 
remedy. But ,  if the answer is “yes,” a balance of interests test  is 
used to decide if there are any just  reasons for the material breach, 
such as  a national emergency.218 
The above methodology has been somewhat simplified. There a re ,  
of course, a t  each level of inquiry, related and detailed inquiries. In  
each problem, it is important that  the  enlistment contract be viewed 
from its four corners before applying any balancing tests.  All too 
often, courts have applied the balancing tests ,  determined the  out- 
come and then applied those general principles which support the  
conclusion. Such a reverse application tends to ignore careful exam- 
ination of the definition antl nature of an “enlistment” and the en- 
listment contract in question. 
VII. PROPOSALS FOR IMPLEMENTION O F  
THE UNIFORM APPROACH 
Aside from judicial recognition of a uniform methodology, specific 
steps can be taken to clarify the  law antl reduce some of the incon- 
sistencies in this area.21y 
A. A.VENDMENT OF THE UNIFORiV CODE OF 
J4ILII’AR Y JUSTICE 
The Uniform Code of Military Justice should be amended to pro- 
vide for court-martial jurisdiction over individuals who may be serv- 
ing under so-called “void” enlistments. 220  The basis for such an 
amendment is well-founded. Despite recent decisions by the Court 
of Military Appeals, the long-standing and overwhelming weight of 
ernment two more years of service before he will be eligible for re t i rement .  I s  t he  
result equitable? What public policy is  being furthered in such a case? If t he  indi- 
vidual had committed an offense while serving in the original ”void“ enlistment 
what public policy would have been violated by considering him amenable to  
court-martial jurisdiction. If an enlistment is to  be declared valid (or a t  least void- 
able) for one purpose (civil aspect of recognizing honorable service) then it should 
also be declared valid for purposes of court-martial jurisdiction. 
218See  notes 66-69 & 138 s u p r a .  
* I 9  Appropriate sections of Title 10, United Sta tes  Code, and Army Reg. 601-210, 
Regular Army Enlistment Program (15 Jan .  1976) should also be amended t o  re- 
flect a workable definition of t he  t e rms  “enlistment” and/or “enlistment contract.” 
**O S e e  notes 176-179 antl accompanying t e s t  s u p m .  
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authority requires  t ha t  a servicemember pending court-martial 
charges may not use his invalid enlistment as  a shield against prose- 
cution. 221 
Jurisdiction would, in effect, be based upon a statutory recogni- 
tion of the "constructive enlistment." The constructive enlistment 
(implied contract) amendment would require that  the parties had a t  
some point intended that  the accused enter  into the soldier-state 
relationship. The recognized criteria w~ould apply: (1) voluntary 
submission to military authority, (2) performance of military duties, 
(3) receipt of pay and allowances, and (4) acceptance of the services 
by the Government.222 Recruiter misconduct would not, by itself, 
nullify jurisdiction unless such misconduct amounted to coercion or  
duress to enlist, and the servicemember never voluntarily sub- 
mitted to military authority: 223 
Article 3, Uniform Code of Military Justice should be amended by 
adding the following provision: 
((1) Persons who are  charged with committing an offense 
punishable by this chapter a r e  amenable to  court- 
martial jurisdiction notwithstanding the absence, for 
any reason, of a valid, formal enlistment agreement i f  
(1) They voluntarily submitted to military authority, 
(2) They performed military duties, 
(3) They received pay antl allowances, and 
(4) The Government accepted the  services rendered. 
The Government's lack of knowledge of the invalid formal 
enl is tment  ag reemen t  will not rel ieve t h e  person of 
amenability to jurisdiction. 
221 See,  e . y . ,  note 194 supra. Allowing an accused to  so  shield himself amounts in 
most cases to a grant  of immunity. If t he  military is unable to  prosecute t he  case, 
there  is usually little, if any, interest  on the  par t  of federal or s ta te  authorities to 
fur ther  burden their  judicial systems. This is  especially t rue  for the  military of- 
fenses (desertion,  AWOL, disrespect,  e t c . )  which are  of little concern to  the  civil- 
ian community but which nevertheless have a direct and dibilitating effect on the  
military community. 
2 2 2  U.S. DEP'T O F  ARMY,  PAMPHLET NO. 27-21, MILITARY ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
HANDBOOK 3-45 (1973). The four cri teria a r e  a compilation drawn from numerous 
opinions, both federal and military, which have discussed constructive enlist- 
ments. 
223 A servicemember who was coerced into enlisting may still effect a constructive 
enlistment if he voluntarily performs military duties af ter  the  coercive influence, 
if any, is removed. United Sta tes  v. Catlow, 23 C.M.A. 142, 146, 48 C.M.R. 758, 
762 (1974). See also United Sta tes  v. Barksdale, 50 C.M.R. 430 (N.C.M.R. 1975). 
However according to  United Sta tes  v. Russo, 23 C.M.A. 511, 50 C.M.R. 650 
(1975), any recruiter misconduct in conjunction with the  coercion voids the  enlist- 
ment antl estops the Government from showing a constructive enlistment. 
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This provision should have no difficulty passing constitutional 
muster.  I t  does not provide for jurisdiction over  civilian^."^ Rather 
it is proposed as a method of overcoming the “estoppel“ theory re- 
lied upon by the Court of Military Appeals.225 The aineiitlment pel.- 
mits, indeed, requires, the Government to  pi-ove military s tatus.  
This statutory change would simply codify the long-standing rule 
that  invalid enlistments could be cured by a “constructive enlist- 
ment.“ 226 I t  should not be viewetl as legislative condonation of re- 
cruiter nialfeasance. 
A broader basis for jurisdiction might be fountlet1 on a (le facto 
s t a tu s  theory.  Satisfaction of t he  four constructive enlistment 
criteria woultl not be required to establish court-martial juristiction. 
Public policy ~voultl favor this basis only if strict limitations ivere 
placed upon its use. For instance, jurisdiction could be established 
only in those cases where the accused was pentling charges punish- 
able by a stated minimum punishment such as confineinent a t  hard 
labor for one year.  Another limitation n ight  consist of restricting 
the de facto basis of jurisdiction t o  overseas war-time situations: 
Article 3 ,  Uniform Code of Military Justice could be amenrletl t o  
provide that :  
( e )  I n  time of war, persons located overseas, not serving 
under a valid formal enlistment agreement nor satis- 
fying the requirements of Article 3(d) of this chapter.  
may be amenable to court-martial jurisdiction if they 
have voluntarily represented themselves to be meni- 
bers of the armed forces antl the Government has re- 
lied upon that representation. 
This provision finds little direct suppoi-t i n  military or fetlei-a1 
opinions. To date,  no opinion clearly equates UY distinguishes the  
concept:: of “constructive enlistment” antl de facto status. A few 
opinions suggest that “equivalent acta“ of militai-J- service may con- 
2 2 4  The Supreme Court has  forbidden the  military to e s e ~ ~ i a e  court-martial  juris- 
diction over civilians. See  United Sta tes  e;’ r e / .  Toth \ .  Quarles. 3.30 U.P. 11 
(19%) (no court-martial  juristliction over discharged soldier for offenses com- 
mitted tvhile 011 active duty) ;  Reid v. Cover t ,  334 US. 1 (1957) ( n o  jurisdiction 
ovei’ civilian dependents accompanying armetl forces overseas in peacetime); Kim 
sella v .  Singleton. 861 U .S .  24 (1960) (expantled Reid to  prohibit ju :  
over civilian dependents in t ime of peace regardless of whether  offenw \vas 11011- 
capital or  capital): Grisham v .  Hagan,  361 U.S. 278 (1960) (no jui.istliction ovei’ 
civ ilia 11 e nip 1 o y ee R a ccu s e tl of coin mitt i ng no n c api t a 1 offense s i 11 peace t i 111 e 1, 
2 2 5  See .  c g . ,  note 119 anti accompanying t e s t  . s i cp / ’ cc .  
226  A similar provision could be incorporated into t h e  enlistment provision:: of 10 
U.S.C $ 5  504-505 (SUPP. VI 1976). 
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stitute a valid change of Arguments against such a provi- 
sion rest  on judicial reluctance to expand court-martial jurisdiction, 
especially over "civilians." However, the individuals falling within 
this provision would not be civilians in the t ruest  sense of the  term. 
The amendment contemplates that  the individuals woultl have vol- 
untarily recognized their military s tatus and used i t  to their advan- 
tage.  Adoption of t he  proposed amendment would alleviate t he  
troublesome jurisdictional loophole left by Ut1 i fes  Sfclfes v. KiIig 
where the  accused, previously discharged, forged documents au- 
thorizing his movement as  a soldier to Europe. The Court of Mili- 
tary Appeals, finding no enlistment contract and no "meeting of the  
minds" labeled King an interloper and found no court-martial juris- 
diction over him. 
Adoption of a broader base of jurisdiction would considerably re- 
227 There is a distinction between the  two theories. The constructive enlistment 
theory has been traditionally based upon an "implied contract" rationale. The four 
recognized cri teria a r e  usually t he  cri teria used by courts in upholding an other- 
wise invalid contract. See  note 222 and accompanying text s u p r a .  A good discus- 
sion of constructive enlistments can be found in United Sta tes  v. King, 11 C.M.A. 
19, 28 C.M.R. 243 (1959) where t he  accused had falsified orders and posed as  a 
serviceman. The Court  of Military Appeals held tha t  criminal activity could not 
effect an enlistment. The accused was an interloper and there  had been no meeting 
of t he  minds. There had been no a t tempt  to  effect an enlistment. 
The "de facto status ' '  theory should be broad enough to  encompass even in ter -  
lopers. Although one of t he  elements of an implied or constructive enlistment may 
be  missing, t he  servicemember may nonetheless have satisfied the  requirement of 
"actual service." See  United S ta t e s  v. Julian, 45 C.M.R. 876 (N.C.M.R. 19'71). 
This theory cuts r ight to the  hear t  of court-martial jurisdiction without pausing t o  
ponder the  legal effects of an invalid enlistment contract. If a competent accused is 
serving as  a uniformed servicemember and commits a crime, any claim he may 
have of casting off his s ta tus  should be stayed pending disposition of his court- 
martial. 
Whether  t he  de  facto s ta tus  theory requires some a t tempt  to  form an enlistment 
contract is not clear. One case equates constructive enlistment to  de  facto enlist- 
ments and also speaks in te rms of acquiring the  s ta tus  of a soldier by acts which 
"are the  equivalent of an enlistment." See United Sta tes  v. Fan t ,  25 C . M . R .  643, 
646 (A.B.R. 1958). A reading of J u l i a u ,  s u p r a ,  indicates that  the  "equivalent 
acts" theory is probably really the  de  facto theory- the existence of an attempted 
enlistment contract is  not required.  Subsequent acts in themselves constitute a 
valid change of s ta tus .  See  also  E x  p a &  Hubbard,  182 F. 76, 81 (D.  Mass. 1910); 
Barre t  v. Looney, 158 F. Supp. 224 (D.  Kan. 1957), a , f f d ,  252 F.2d 588 (10th Cir.  
1958), c e r f .  d e n i e d ,  357 U.S. 940 (1958); Irr r e  McVey, 23 F. 878, 879 (D.  Ca l .  
1853) (petitioner was a de  facto soldier because (1) he voluntarily assumed obliga- 
tions and (2) he had a t tempted to secure t he  rights of an  enlisted man). But see 
Jackson v.  United Sta tes ,  551 F.2d 282 (Ct .  C1. 1977), where the  court stated in 
dicta tha t  10 U.S.C. 6 505 (1970) required writ ten instruments for enlistment,  
"otherwise t he re  would be no way the  government could determine which branch 
of t he  service was involved nor t he  term or conditions of t he  enlistment." 551 F.2d 
a t  285. 
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duce the inconsistencies between the federal and military courts. 228 
Both theories incorporate a balance of interests test.  Where the  
servicemember has committed a crime, his interests a re  outweighed 
by the interests of the Government antl the public. 
. 
B. AMENDMENT OF ARLlrlY REGULATION 63.5-,'00 
P ERSO " E L  SEPARATIONS- 
ENLISTED PERSONNEL 
The uniform approach could also be implemented in changes to 
personnel regulations which prescribe procedures for processing 
fradulent or irregular entry cases. Specifically, Army Regulation 
635-200, Chapter 14,229 should be amended to reflect the following: 
An enlistment is a contract which changes status. Al- 
though the  servicemember may have en tered  the  
service in a fraudulent manner, the subsequent con- 
duct of the  parties may have formed an implied con- 
tract.  
All cases should be referred to a board of officers for 
disposition. The board should, upon the advice of the 
Staff Judge Advocate: - 
examine the enlistment contract and its annexes; 
consider all available evidence and, according to 
general principles of contract law, determine if an 
implied contract has been formed; 230 antl 
balance the interests of the servicemember, the 
Government, and the public. Factors to be consid- 
ered are:  (i) the basis for disqualification; (ii) na- 
The s ta tu tory  basis might arguably extend in war time to inductees serving 
under an invalid induction order.  Although the element of voluntariness \voultl 
probably be missing, t he  needs of the  war-time Army vastly outweigh the  intluc- 
tee 's  r ight to avoid court-martial jurisdiction on what usually amounts to the ai'- 
gument tha t  the  Government failed to follow its  regulations. The intent here  is t o  
fill jurisdictional gaps for those who in some manner "volunteer" their  services 
and commit an offense. 
229 The purpose of proposed changes to the  personnel regulations is to recognize 
tha t  fraudulent enlistments should be viewed as  voidable a t  t he  option of the  Gov- 
ernment.  Chapter  14 is only one area  of proposed change. Appropriate amentl- 
ments would have to  be made to  o ther  provisions dealing generally with enlipt- 
ment contracts.  S e e .  e.g.. DAPC-PAS-0714002 Feb .  7 5 ,  SUBJ:  Interim Change to 
A R  635-200 Paragraphs 5-32 antl 5-12. For  comments on current procedures for 
disposition of fraudulent enlistments see notes 116-119 s t c p i v .  
230 The four recognized criteria for finding a constructive enlistment \voultl be 
applied. S e e  note 222 sicpi'n.  
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tu re  of recruiter misconduct, if any; (iii) the  length 
and character of creditable service; and, (iv) the  
servicemember’s potential contribution to the serv- 
ice. 
(3) The board’s conclusions and recommendations should 
be forwarded to MILPERCEN,  Wash. D.C. for ac- 
t ion. 
A centralized collection point for enlistment problems lends consitl- 
erably to uniformity. 
C .  A:WEND,WENT OF ARLVY REGULATION 
RECRUITING PROCEDURES 
A particularly bothersome area of enlistments is found in the po- 
tential abuse in declaring eligibility requirements to be for the pri- 
mary benefit of the  servicemember. The problem could be elimi- 
nated by amending the  appropriate tables to reflect that  the re- 
quirements are for the benefit of (1) the Government, (2) the re- 
cruit, or (3) both the Government and the recruit. Such an amend- 
ment could be included in a “policy” paragraph or  as an amendment 
to each eligibility requirement or  to a series of eligibility require- 
ments. So designating the eligibility criteria would greatly reduce 
the  leeway now enjoyed by the courts in interpreting the  eligibility 
criteria.231 At the  same time the  Government would continue to  
exercise paramount control over eligibility requirements. 
601 4 l U ,  
VIII. CONCLUSION 
I f a  i i i a ~  icill begirl ivith ce?*fai, i t ies,  h e  shall e i i d  i i !  
doiibts; but if he icill be coizfeut to begiu with doubts ,  he  
shall eud certcri)!ties.232 
In Uitited States u.  Blakeirey the Virginia Supreme Court acl- 
dressed the ability of a minor to enter  into an enlistment contract 
and bear arms: 
If such ability in reference to  [the statutory age requirement] was  
still t o  be a subject of judicial decision, instead of official discretion, 
231 S e e ,  e.g., United Sta tes  v .  Lit t le,  24 C . M . A .  328, 52 C.M.R.  39 (197G); United 
Sta tes  v .  Russo,  23 C.M.A. 511, 50 C.M.R.  G50 (19’75). See g e , i e i n / / y  notes 106- 
112 s/cp,YI. 
232 F. BACON. THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING, ch. 5 (1605). 
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then it must  be tleterminetl not by the  special circumstanceh of each 
particular case,  bu t  by a general rule of uniform application.23r1 
The three-step uniform approach proposed in this article is a means 
of disposing of enlistment problems by a rule of general application. 
I t  is an attempt to resolve some of the uncertainties ant1 inequities 
that  exist i n  the law of enlistments. In  applying the uniform ap- 
proach several pi-inciples must be considered: 
(a)  The Government's power to raise and support armies 
is paramount. It  decides \Tho may serve ant1 the con- 
ditions of military service. 
(b)  The enlistment contract between an individual ant1 
the Government changes the individual's s tatus from 
citizen to soldier antl places enforceable obligations 
(as tloes any other contract) on both parties. 
(e) Although general principles of conti-act law should be 
applied in interpreting an enlistment contract,  the  
contract is unique. The Government 's  paramount  
powers antl the absence of complete mutuality a re  fac- 
to rs  Lvhich render  it unique. Thus,  the  element of 
"contract" ant1 the element of military "status" must 
be considered together in determining the effect antl 
validity of the enlistment contract. 
((1) Public policy should prevent the servicemember- from 
avoitling court-martial jurisdiction by using an invalid 
enlistment contract as a shield. 
Each of these foul. principles is a composite of numerous rules, opin- 
ions, policies, antl decisions. In the aggregate, they represent the 
mainstream of judicial ant1 administrative authority. They should be 
applied in resolving any enlistment problem. 
The inconsistent judicial ant1 administrative v i e w  toward the en- 
list men t c o 11 t rac t oft en arise from tl e t ail ed attention to individual 
fact situations antl from inattention to controlling principles of ap- 
plicable law. This ivhole area of la\v is a collage of opinions with 
little rhyme or reason-no one statute controls, no one decision is 
tlispositive. 
The uniform approach is a blending of the foregoing principles. I t  
recognizes the federal position that enlistment contracts create a 
contractual relationship bet\veen the soldier antl the s tate .  Ant1 it 
also recognizes the  equally important emphasis by military au- 
':j3 44 V a .  (:; G ~ i i t t . )  387 (1.8471, S e e  U h f J  n u t e a  18-26 ant1 awompanyinp  t e s t  
S i (  p JYI  . 
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thorities on the  creation of a unique status. As a hybrid approach, it 
draws from the best of many divergent perspectives. Thus, as a 
practical application which adopts a common definition, applies con- 
tract principles, and balances the interests,  the uniform approach is 
both a plausible and desirable method for solving enlistment prob- 
lems. 
What has oiice beeii sef t led  b y  a precedelit will ?lot be U N -  
sef f le i l  o v e w i g h f ,  fo i .  certcriitfy aiid u ~ i f o ~ i ~ i f y  are g a i ~ s  
Hot 1ighfl.y to be sacr i f iced .  234 
234 B. C A R D O Z O ,  THE P A R A D O X E S  O F  LEGAL S C I E N C E  (1928). 
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ENLISTMENT PROBLEMS: DECISION FLOW CHART 
[y- 




1. A distinction can be made between "constructive enlistment" and "de facto status." 
See note 203 supra .  
2 .  For proposed statute Bee section VI S u F r l .  
3 .  Where servicemember is pending charges, public policy should usually tip 
balance in favor of Government (jurisdiction exists). 
4 .  Although formal valid contract i s  lacking, individual may have standing to 
argue material breach o f  contract on grounds of constructive enlistment 
(implied contract). 
5 .  Even though material breach may have occurred, factors such as "supervening 
statute" and "national emergency" should be considered. 
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